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The dissertation contains four stand-alone studies, chapters 2 through 5. In chapter 1, I 
highlight commonalities among the studies. 
  In chapter 2, I consider the principle of structural balance – “The friend of a 
friend is a friend, the enemy of a friend is an enemy, the friend of an enemy is an 
enemy, and the enemy of an enemy is a friend.” I consider Harary’s (1954) result that 
this principle can only be satisfied in a world consisting of two inimical friendship 
cliques. And I consider recent studies that show that when individuals in a structurally 
imbalanced world change ties one by one following the principle, they do not 
necessarily end up in a structurally balanced world. I prove that if multiple ties can be 
changed simultaneously, then a structurally balanced world is guaranteed. 
  In chapter 3, I consider Burt’s (1992) argument of “structural holes” that 
unconnected parts of a social network are niches for brokerage. I consider Burt’s 
suggestion that those aware of brokerage benefits end up occupying structurally 
advantaged network positions. I show how this statement crucially depends on the 
unawareness of these benefits by others. If everyone strives for structural holes, no one 
ends up with a structural advantage. 
  In chapter 4, I consider the extensive laboratory evidence on the relationship 
between the structure of small exchange networks and expected exchange rates. I 
consider a theory that reasonably predicts this relationship in a handful of networks. I 
show that if individuals add ties that increase expected earnings from exchange more 
than they cost and delete all other ties, then networks emerge that distribute exchange 
benefits equally.  
  In chapter 5, I consider the old immigrant assimilation model of a monotonic 
process. I consider recent work in the direction of an alternative model. I propose an 
alternative model that follows up on this work and adds minimal complexity to the old 
model. In this model, quite assimilated migrants further assimilate, while not so 
assimilated migrants reverse-assimilate. Using longitudinal survey data, I show that 
the model is empirically competitive. 
  In chapter 6, I propose four follow-up studies. 
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CHAPTER 1: COMMONALITIES AMONG THE FOUR STUDIES 
 
The dissertation contains four self-contained studies, chapters 2 through 5. 
These studies are all motivated by two classic observations of modern society. The 
first is that its members are autonomous. Terms commonly associated with modernity 
are freedom, individualism, and rationality. We are legally backed and normatively 
pressured to do what is good for ourselves. 
The second observation is that what we have autonomy over, what we possess 
and what we know, was not produced by our own hands and not experienced through 
our own eyes. We received it through production chains, exchange connections, and 
information channels. In modern society, then, people are independent in their life 
choices but interdependent in the consequences of these choices. 
  These two observations suggest a particular approach towards explaining 
modern society. Given observation one, an explanatory strategy of understanding a 
social phenomenon as the product of actions taken by autonomous actors should fare 
well. This strategy is called methodological individualism. My approach is 
methodologically individualist. 
Given observations one and two, a tool for the analysis of situations with 
actors independently making decisions that have interdependent outcomes should be 
useful. Two such tools are game theory and agent-based modeling. My approach 
makes use of both tools. 
Given observation two, how we are tied to our social environment should 
determine the distribution of wealth and knowledge in society. Extensive theoretical 
and empirical research on social networks has over the past decades established a 
number of social network principles, principles of how network structure translates 
into individual wealth and knowledge. I use these principles in my approach.  
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Given observations one and two, we have both the freedom and the incentive 
to selectively pick the interaction partners that we deem good for ourselves and to 
exclude others. In my approach, I assume that we attempt to maximize our wealth 
through the rational choice of interaction partners. I assume optimization in the choice 
of social contacts. 
Figure 1.1 visually represents this derivation of my approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Derivation of the Explanatory Approach of the Dissertation 
 
I apply this approach to the study of four types of members of modern society: 
Friends, traders, managers, and immigrants. For each, I ask two questions that 
sociologists typically ask, the cohesion question and the inequality question: How 
cohesive is society? How unequal is society? In order to answer these questions, I look 
at respectively the structure of the expected network and the distribution of wealth and 
information that it gives rise to. I obtain this expected network by taking the 
aforementioned approach. Making the individual the methodological unit of analysis, I 
use game theory and agent-based modeling to compute the network that we would 
Members make choices 
independently of each other 
Consequences of choices 
depend on others’ choices 
Methodologically individualist 
Observations of modern society: Explanation of modern society: 
Uses game theory and agent-based modeling
Assumes known benefits of networks 
Assumes optimization in choice of social contacts 
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expect to observe in modern society if its members constructed their personal 
networks such that they maximize the benefits that they derive from them. Here I 
preview the four applications. 
 
Friends 
It has been argued that we find structural imbalances among our friends 
uncomfortable (the social network principle). The so-called principle of structural 
balance lists the configurations of friendships that we feel comfortable with: ‘The 
friend of a friend is a friend, the enemy of a friend is an enemy, the friend of an enemy 
is an enemy, and the enemy of an enemy is a friend.’ In chapter 2, I compute how 
much friendship there would be (the cohesion question), and how comfortable each of 
us would feel about our friendships (the inequality question), if we individually 
(methodological individualism) made friends and enemies by maximizing the number 
of structurally balanced configurations (optimization in the choice of social contacts). 
 
Managers 
Ties that connect otherwise unconnected groups, thereby spanning so-called 
‘structural holes’, benefit the broker (the social network principle). Managers in 
contemporary business schools learn how to strategically add ‘non-redundant’ ties that 
connected otherwise unconnected groups and delete ‘redundant’ ties that do not 
(optimization in the choice of social contacts). In chapter 3, I compute how dense and 
thus redundant in equilibrium (using game theory and agent-based modeling) 
managers’ social networks would be (the cohesion question), and how structurally 
advantaged some managers would be over others (the inequality question), if they 
individually (methodological individualism) pursued structural holes. 
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Traders 
How well people do in trade heavily depends on how they are connected to 
potential exchange partners (the social network principle). A branch of sociology that 
deals with bargaining outcomes in small networks provides methods for translating 
patterns of exchange relations into average profit. In chapter 4, I compute how dense 
in equilibrium (using game theory and agent-based modeling) exchange networks 
would be (the cohesion question), and how unequally the gains from trade would be 
distributed (the inequality question), if we individually (methodological individualism) 
initiated trade relations that increased our net profit and got rid of costly ones 
(optimization in the choice of social contacts). 
 
Immigrants 
The immigrant assimilation process is a process of network change. The 
dissimilated migrant has only co-ethnic friends, colleagues, and neighbors while the 
ethnicities of the contacts of the assimilated migrant represent their proportional 
presence in society. At the societal level this contrast translates into the metaphors 
‘mosaic’, a society with segregated ethnic enclaves, and ‘melting pot’, a society with 
blending ethnic contacts, respectively. The social capital in the ties between migrants 
have been argued and shown to be of vital importance, providing them with the trust 
and information to survive in the host society (the social network principle). 
Immigrants are fully aware of these benefits (optimization in the choice of social 
contacts). In chapter 5, I compute how a migrant’s (methodological individualism) 
strategic decisions about who to work with, where to live, and who to be friends with 
determine overall levels of assimilation (the cohesion question), and how immigrant 
group differences in initial levels of financial, human, and social capital differentiate 
their members into assimilators and dissimilators (the inequality question). 
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In addition to these commonalities, chapters 2, 3, and 4 share a form of theory 
building. Simplistic assumptions about individuals are made that prevent the 
derivation of predictive hypotheses from the models but allow for the derivation of 
understandable, insight-generating theoretical results.  In chapter 5, a different strategy 
is taken. A model of immigrant assimilation is built, not from a consistent set of 
simplistic assumptions, but by combining a number of unrelated hypotheses borrowed 
from the literature. Finally, in chapter 6, I draw on the various limitations and 
unanswered questions that I identified in the four discussion sections of chapters 2 
through 5 to develop a research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURAL BALANCE IN EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 
“The friend of a friend is a friend, the enemy of a friend is an enemy, the friend 
of an enemy is an enemy, and the enemy of an enemy is a friend.” Heider (1946) 
argued and Jordan (1953) experimentally confirmed that we find situations that violate 
this principle of structural balance less pleasant than situations that do not.
1 
Mathematical psychologist Frank Harary (1954:143-4) showed that the only two states 
of the world in which the principle applies to the relations between any three persons 
are global peace and bipolar war. Either everyone is friends, or people are divided up 
into two antagonistic groups. Representing persons as points, and relations between 
persons as lines that are either friendly, indicated by a ‘+’, or inimical, indicated by a 
‘–’, these two states of the world can be visually represented as in figures 2.1 and 2.2 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. One Friendship Clique: Global Balance 
 
 
                                                 
1 Heider’s original “balance theory” is more general, allowing the third person to be an object, and 
liking to be unreciprocated. 
+ 
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Figure 2.2. Two Antagonistic Friendship Cliques: Global Balance 
 
 
Harary’s result is an efficiency result. It tells us what the world would look like 
if we collectively managed to eliminate any cognitive constraint from structural 
imbalance. Methodologically individualist social science seeks results about the 
relationship between efficiency and equilibrium, the aggregation of individual action 
into collective outcomes (e.g. McClamrock 1991). For example, the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics states that buyers and suppliers in perfect markets in 
equilibrium trade efficiently. Individual striving for welfare maximization, as through 
some invisible hand, leads to collective welfare maximization. Recently, a literature 
has emerged that models such aggregation when utility is not derived from 
consumption or production bundles, but from network relations instead (e.g. Dutta & 
Jackson 2003). 
  Five studies have investigated the relationship between efficiency and 
equilibrium for the welfare principle of structural balance (Antal et al. 2005; Hummon 
& Doreian 2003; Kulakowsky et al. 2006; Kuwabara 2006; Wang & Thorngate 2003). 
In each of these studies, the unit of analysis has been the relation. Relations were 
swapped between states of friendship and enmity one by one, where changes that 
decreased imbalance in adjacent triads were more likely than changes that increased 
+  + 
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imbalance. Antal et al. (2005:7) discovered globally imbalanced (inefficient) networks 
in which no relational change could be made that decreased local balance 
(equilibrium). An example of such a network is three antagonistic groups (figure 2.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Three Antagonistic Friendship Cliques: Global Imbalance 
 
Yet relations do not experience psychological imbalance and thus feel no need 
to restore it. The individuals that make up the relation – and that make up also other 
relations with other individuals – are the ones that perceive and restore balance. The 
relevant decision-making unit is the individual, not the relation. In previous models, 
agents were not maximizing their own welfare, but the welfare of an adjacent tie. It is 
not clear whether in these studies inefficient equilibria could be found simply because 
agents could only change one tie at a time, or because Harary’s globally balanced 
states are indeed not the only possible outcomes of individual welfare maximization. 
Here I argue that global balance is nevertheless the inevitable end product of 
agents' sequential imbalance reductions. I do so by showing that, when the restriction 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+
+
+
+ + 
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of one tie change at a time is eliminated from agents’ action space, in any imbalanced 
network some agent can always decrease local balance by making herself structurally 
equivalent to some other agent. 
  Let me reintroduce Harary’s notation. “A signed graph G, or briefly an s-
graph, consists of a set E of n points P1, P2, …, Pn together with two disjoint subsets 
L
+, L
- of the set of all unordered pairs of distinct points. The elements of the sets L
+, L
- 
are called positive lines and negative lines respectively”, “A path is a collection of 
lines of the form A1A2, A2A3, …, Am-1Am where the points A1, A2, …, Am are distinct. 
The cycle A1A2…Am of G consists of the path described above together with the line 
AmA1”, “A positive cycle of an s-graph is one in which the number of negative lines is 
even; a negative cycle is not positive. An s-graph is in balance if all its cycles are 
positive” and “Two points A and B of G are adjacent if the line AB is in G. A complete 
graph is one in which each point is adjacent to every other point.” (p. 143) Using this 
notation, he formulated the structure theorem: 
 
Structure Theorem. “A complete s-graph is balanced if and only if its point set E is 
partitioned into two disjoint subsets E1 and E2, one of which may be empty, such that 
all lines between points of the same subset are positive and all lines between points of 
the two different subsets are negative.” (p. 143) 
 
I introduce a few additional definitions. Let us call cycles involving three 
points triads. Let G
F = (F, L
+F, L
-F) be the subgraph of a signed graph G = (E, L
+, L
-) 
generated by a subset F of E where L
F is the set of lines in L with both points in F. 
Two s-graphs G1 and G2 with the same set of points E are A-equivalent if G1
F = G2
F 
where F = E\A. Denote by t(G, A) the number of negative triads containing A in G. 
Two points Ai and Aj in G are structurally equivalent if AiAk∈L
+⇔ AjAk∈L
+ and  
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AiAk∈L
-⇔ AjAk∈L
- (Wasserman & Faust 1994:356). 
 
Agency Theorem. For any imbalanced complete s-graph G0 there exists a sequence of 
complete s-graphs G1, ..,, GD and a sequence of points x0, .., xD-1 such that GD is 
balanced and Gd and Gd+1 are xd-equivalent and t(Gd, xd) > t(Gd+1, xd) for d = 0, ... , D-
1. 
 
Proof. Consider any line AiAj in a negative triad in Gd. Without loss of generality, 
assume t(Gd, Ai) ≥ t(Gd, Aj). Now construct Gd+1 such that Gd and Gd+1 are Ai-
equivalent and Ai and Aj are structurally equivalent. By structural equivalence of Ai 
and Aj, t(Gd+1, Ai) = t(Gd+1, Aj). Since all triads in Gd+1 that connect both Ai and Aj are 
positive, while some were negative in Gd, and the sign of all triads in Gd+1 that 
involved Aj but not Ai remained unchanged, t(Gd, Aj) > t(Gd+1, Aj). It follows that t(Gd, 
Ai) > t(Gd+1, Ai). By Ai-equivalence of Gd and Gd+1, triads in Gd and Gd+1 that do not 
involve Ai are of the same sign, so that ∑k t(Gd, Ak) > ∑k t(Gd+1, Ak). Therefore, for 
large enough D, ∑k t(GD, Ak) = 0, and hence GD is balanced. 
 
It is thus not only the case, as Harary showed, that collective imbalance 
minimization implies one or two opposed camps. Under the principle of structural 
balance, welfare-seeking agents self-organize to produce such a world. They are 
“either with us or against us.” Classrooms should form maximally two peer groups (cf. 
Snijders 2001). International relations equilibrate towards Axis-Allies configurations, 
especially in the lead up to a war (Moore 1978). 
The result is robust in three ways. First, it does not require restrictive 
rationality assumptions. It guarantees the existence of a sequence of local imbalance-
reducing changes towards ultimate global balance from any starting network. Agents  
 11
need not always maximize individual welfare to reach global balance. They may 
satisfice, imitate, or learn, and make mistakes. Also, they may be myopic – caring only 
about improved balance immediately after their action – or farsighted – anticipating 
subsequent actions by other agents. All that is required is that on average, agents 
reduce local imbalance. Second, Davis (1967) proposed an adjustment of the principle 
of structural balance in response to socio-metric data, where the triad consisting of 
three negative lines is considered positive rather than negative. With this alternative 
definition of triad positivity, the agency theorem can simply be proven by considering 
a sequence of mappings in which agents make enemies with everyone else. Third, the 
structure theorem has also been stated for incomplete graphs (Harary 1954:144). 
Hummon & Doreian (2003) and Wang and Thorngate (2003) accordingly give agents 
the option to eliminate lines. Clearly, agents can then always reach global balance by 
means of mere isolation. 
A weakness is that the result currently relies on agents’ ability to force 
friendships and enmities upon others. The result would be strengthened if it were 
shown in future work that a route to global balance exists even when sign changes 
require permission by the other agent in the respective relation. 
  
 12
References 
Antal, Tibor, Paul L. Krapivsky, and Sydney Redner. 2005. “Dynamics of Social 
Balance on Networks.” Physical Review E 72: 036121. 
Davis, James A. 1967. “Clustering and Structural Balance in Graphs.” Human 
Relations 30: 181–7. 
Dutta, Bhaskar and Matthew Jackson. 2003. Networks and Groups: Models of 
Strategic Formation. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Harary, Frank. 1954. “On the Notion of Balance of a Signed Graph.” Michigan 
Mathematics Journal 2: 143–6. 
Heider, Frits. 1946. “Attitudes and Cognitive Organization.” Journal of Psychology 
21: 107–12. 
Hummon, Norman P. and Patrick Doreian. 2003. “Some Dynamics of Social Balance 
Processes: Bringing Heider Back into Balance Theory.” Social Networks 25: 
17–49. 
Jordan, Nehemiah. 1953. “Behavioral Forces that are a Function of Attitudes and of 
Cognitive Organization.” Human Relations 6: 273–87. 
Kulakowski, Krzysztof, Przemyslaw Gawrónski, and Piotr Gronek. 2006. The Heider 
Balance – A Continuous Approach. Working paper. 
Kuwabara, Ko. 2006. Dyadic and Triadic Processes in the Dynamics of Structural 
Balance. Working paper. 
McClamrock, Ron. 1991. “Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constituive 
Principle of Scientific Inquiry.” Philosophical Psychology 4: 343–54. 
Moore, Michael. 1978. “An International Application of Heider’s Balance Theory.” 
European Journal of Social Psychology 8: 401-5. 
Snijders, Tom A.B. 2001. “The Statistical Evaluation of Social Network Dynamics.” 
Pp. 361-95 in Sociological Methodology, edited by Michael E. Sobel and Mark  
 13
P. Becker. Boston: Basil Blackwell. 
Wang, Zhigang and Warren Thorngate. 2003. “Sentiment and Social Mitosis: 
Implications of Heider’s Balance Theory.” Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation 6:1. 
  14
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL HOLES IN EQUILIBRIUM 
 
(with Vincent Buskens) 
 
Introduction 
Ideas about how positions in social networks are of use to people occupying 
them are abundant in sociology. The structure of one’s social environment has been 
shown to matter in a number of ways. Balanced triads generate less cognitive 
inconsistency (Heider 1946; Krackhardt 1999). Job search through weak ties is more 
successful (Granovetter 1995 [1974]). Non-excludable trading parties have larger 
profit margins (Cook and Emerson 1978; Willer 1999). Dense structures and closure 
in networks facilitate trust (Coleman 1988; Raub and Weesie 1990; Buskens 2002; 
Burt 2005). And, ties between otherwise unconnected groups, that thereby span so-
called “structural holes”, benefit the broker (Burt 1992). The last example will be the 
focus of this paper. 
  Those results constitute an important body of structural regularities, but from 
an agency perspective, they are only half the story. They enable us to understand 
consequences of certain network positions, but not how actors manage to reach these 
positions. The link from micro back to macro that completes the sociological 
explanation of real-world networks, from individual decisions on who to interact with 
to emergent global networks, is missing. Yet precisely in the individual preferences 
over network positions that social networks have been argued and shown to give rise 
to lies the very key to their explanation. If some networks are more beneficial than 
others, actors can be expected to modify the less beneficial ones to their advantage 
(Flap 2003, pp. 12–3). The network becomes a “device to be manipulated consciously  
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for an actor’s own ends” (Watts 1999, p. 495). People rebalance triads, breaking with 
friends whom other friends do not like. Traders actively seek out alternative trading 
parties as to enhance their bargaining positions. 
By the mere non-atomic nature of networks, such actions will be 
interdependent – one can only broker as long as two brokees remain unconnected – 
and partly collective – it takes two to connect. Each choice to connect or disconnect 
then becomes contingent upon another’s previous choice and precursor of a next. An 
initial network change may thus trigger non-trivial network evolution. Sociologists 
have only recently begun to explore this agency component of social network analysis 
in more detail (e.g., Doreian and Stokman 1997; Snijders 2001, 2005). In this paper, 
we will further develop theoretical insight into which networks can be expected to 
emerge when actors purposively choose their relationships. In particular, we develop a 
model in which actors strive for structural holes. 
  When Ronald Burt (1992) launched his idea of structural holes, he went 
beyond structuralism. He did not assume that actors would simply reap the fruits from 
structural advantages that they happen to have over others. He suggested the 
possibility that entrepreneurs, just as they can strategically put financial and human 
resources to work, exploit social resources and turn them into a profit: “You enter the 
structural hole between two players to broker the relationship between them” (Burt 
1992, p. 34). Burt even went so far as to argue that social capital implies prior strategic 
networking: “I will treat motivation and opportunity as one and the same...a network 
rich in entrepreneurial opportunity surrounds a player motivated to be entrepreneurial. 
At the other extreme, a player innocent of entrepreneurial motive lives in a network 
devoid of entrepreneurial opportunity” (1992, p. 36). Burt’s “structural entrepreneur 
personality index” (2005, p. 34) is an attempt to quantify this inclination to exploit  
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social resources.  
  Nevertheless, the agency component in Burt’s argument was never as fully 
developed as the structure component. Burt proposed a precise measure of structural 
disadvantage, the “constraint” formula (1992, p. 54), but the network dynamics he 
sketches in his book are instructions on how to unilaterally reduce one’s score on the 
constraint measure (see figure 3.1). He thereby remained at the micro level, showing 
how an ego-network would change with structural holes as the driving force assuming 
cooperation and passivity on behalf of all alters. Thus neutralizing the interdependence 
between actors, he precluded possible cascades of subsequent network adaptations by 
other actors. Burt (2005, ch. 5) deals with some of these issues informally. Although 
his considerations are very insightful, they lack a strict theoretical deduction. For 
example, he speculates on the emergence of stable networks if network benefits are 
extended beyond brokerage to include closure, and if these benefits and also the costs 
of ties are heterogeneous among actors. We think that such speculations are 
unwarranted. We show that with much simpler assumptions, analysis is already 
challenging. 
We will limit ourselves to formalizing network dynamics with a single type of 
benefit and with homogeneous actors. Clearly, these are strong, simplifying 
assumptions. Strategic networking will be more salient in some settings than in others, 
and in any particular setting not everybody will be equally interested in or able to 
occupy strong entrepreneurial positions. Still, our model provides an insightful 
benchmark that can straightforwardly be modified to accommodate more complex 
assumptions. In the discussion section, we indicate which assumptions are crucial for 
our findings and which can be relaxed without changing the substantive results. 
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Source: Figure 1.4 in Burt (1992) 
Figure 3.1. Optimizing for Structural Holes 
 
In Burt’s typical example of a network after entrepreneurial activity (see figure 
3.1), the majority of benefits are held by a single individual. However, in figure 3.1 no 
one else was granted an opportunity to add and delete ties. The environment around 
the focal actor was held fixed. We consider figure 3.1 a step in a series of network 
changes by interdependent actors who together equilibrate towards or around a certain 
stable end network. It is not obvious what this end network is. It is also not obvious 
that if everyone would like to follow the entrepreneur’s example the structural 
advantage of the initial entrepreneur automatically disappears. Some economic studies  
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of network dynamics in information and communication settings have identified the 
“star,” a winner-take-all network in which a single entrepreneur receives and 
maintains all of the profit, as the unique stable network (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; 
Bala and Goyal 2000; Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2007) even though all peripheral 
actors would like to be the central actor in these networks. In this paper, we show that 
the “star” is not stable if everyone tries to minimize his network constraint. By 
pursuing the following aims, we come to this conclusion. 
  Our first aim is to extend and improve the methodology for answering 
questions about which networks can be expected to emerge given that we know how 
actors benefit from network positions in a certain context. This involves the 
development of a model of network formation and a comparison of existing and new 
stability concepts indicating in which networks strategic actors will not make any 
further changes. In addition, we develop a tool to determine which of the stable 
networks are more or less likely to emerge. Our second aim is to apply this 
methodology to answer the question how empirically observed access and control 
benefits from brokerage would be distributed in equilibrium if actors strove to obtain 
these access and control benefits. Will a minority broker the rest and claim a majority 
of benefits, as Burt’s informal treatment and economic studies suggest, or will 
everyone share the profits? Thus, we model network evolution not employing a 
stylized utility function, as previous economic studies have done, but instead assuming 
a relationship between network structure and profit that has solid empirical backing. 
Burt (1992) provides us with such an empirically tenable measure of access and 
control benefits, as we will argue in the next section. In this way, we build bridges 
between the sociological and economic literatures in this area.  
  We first review the structural-hole argument and the dynamic networks  
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literature. Then we introduce a model of network entrepreneurship, explain the 
stability concepts we use, and identify two classes of stable networks. In both classes 
of networks, entrepreneurs share profits equally, but in the one more total profit is 
earned than in the other. Using simulation, we show that networks from this more 
efficient class – balanced complete bipartite networks – evolve with a much higher 
likelihood than the others. In these networks, everybody has a strong network position 
in terms of structural holes, but no one has a structural advantage over other actors. 
Our model – contrary to what existing economic models of network dynamics tell us – 
thus predicts a “network race” in which no one is able to maintain an advantaged 
position. 
  
Structural Holes 
Structural holes are “disconnections or nonequivalencies between players” and 
hence “entrepreneurial opportunities for information access, timing, referrals and 
control” (Burt 1992, p. 1−2). There exists a structural hole between two players if 
there is a potential for beneficial information flow between them. The word 
“disconnections” in the above definition refers to the absence of a tie or path through 
which the information can flow. 
A network rich in structural holes thus contains many exploitable brokering 
opportunities: “The structural hole is an opportunity to broker the flow of information 
between people and to control the form of projects that bring together people from 
opposite sides of the hole” (1997, p. 340). The network entrepreneur recognizes these 
opportunities and places himself in the hole by initiating ties with both players. Just as 
the investment banker and the human resource manager generate returns from 
financial and human capital, so does the network entrepreneur seek profit in  
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information structure. “When you take the opportunity to be the tertius, you are an 
entrepreneur in the literal sense of the word – a person who generates profit from 
being between others” (1992, p. 34). Occupying the hole and being essential to the 
information flow between the two, the entrepreneur can charge a brokering fee. 
Burt introduced a formula for quantifying the benefits from spanning structural 
holes, the “constraint” measure. Entrepreneurial opportunities are considered 
constrained if there exists a feasible alternative road along which the information you 
are intending to broker can travel: “Contact j constrains your entrepreneurial 
opportunities to the extent that: (a) you’ve made a large investment of time and energy 
to reach j, and (b) j is surrounded by few structural holes with which you could 
negotiate to get a favorable return on the investment” (1992, p. 54).
1 The constraint 
measure ci captures the extent to which this is the case for each contact j of actor i: 
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where pij is the proportion of time i has invested in contact j. Burt assumes that an 
actor distributes his time equally over his contacts: If i is connected to j, pij = 1/di, 
where di is actor i’s degree. If i and j are not connected, pij = 0. The constraint measure 
ci lies between 0 and 9/8 (see theorem 0 in the Appendix) and is 0 for isolates. This 
implies that isolates have the lowest constraint. It seems more plausible, though, that it 
is better to be connected in some way than not to be connected at all, and we think 
                                                 
1 In recent work (e.g., Burt 2005), Burt multiplies his index by 100 and rounds to compare integer 
values of the index. We will use the original formulation in this paper. Of course, both formalizations 
are equivalent. As an alternative, we will show that our results stay the same if we use a relative version 
of the constraint formula as a measure of benefits, where an actor’s network benefits equals the 
reciprocal of his constraint score divided by the sum of all actors’ constraint scores, representing the 
idea that an entrepreneur wants a “better” position than the others in the network.  
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Burt did not intend isolates to be least constrained. Therefore, we additionally assume 
that ci = 2 for isolates.
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cA = 4 (¼ + 0)
2 = ¼  cA = 2 (¼ + 0)
2 + 2 (¼ + ¼ ½)
2 = 13/32   cA = 3 (⅓ + 0)
2 = ⅓ 
cB = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1  cB = (½  + ½ ¼)
2 + (½ + ½ ½)
2 = 61/64   cB = 2 (½ + 0)
2 = ½ 
cC = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1  cC = (½  + ½ ¼)
2 + (½ + ½ ½)
2 = 61/64   cC = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1 
cD = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1  cD = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1            cD = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1 
cE = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1  cE = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1            cE = 1 (1/1 + 0)
2 = 1 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The Constraint Measure; Three Example Networks 
 
 
The higher the score on this measure ci, the more structural opportunities are 
constrained, and as a result, the lower the network benefits. Consider as an example 
figure 3.2. In the network on the left, actor A is essential for all information flow. His 
constraint score is cA = 4 (¼ + 0)
2 = ¼. In the middle network, B and C can also 
communicate directly rather than through A. This constrains the relations between A 
and B and A and C. A’s constraint score is now cA = 2 (¼ + 0)
2 + 2 (¼ + ¼ ½)
2 = 
                                                 
2 The precise value is irrelevant for the results of the model as long as the value is larger than 9/8. The 
consequence of this assumption is further, as we will see below, that actors always want to connect with 
isolates and isolates want this as well. This property is in correspondence with the more general 
property that we will derive that actors are always willing to connect as long as the connection does not 
create any closed triads. 
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13/32. In fact, a network without one of the two “redundant” ties with B and C would 
be better for A (on redundancy, see Burt 1992, p. 51). In the network on the right, A’s 
constraint is lower, namely cA = 3 (⅓ + 0)
2 = ⅓ < 13/32. Therefore, actor A is willing 
to give up his relation with C in the middle network of figure 3.2 and move to the 
network on the right.   
The constraint formula has been found negatively related to a wide range of 
objective indicators of success (see Burt 2000, 2002, and 2005 for extensive reviews). 
Producer profit margins are larger for firms in buyer-supplier networks (Burt et al. 
2002; Talmud 1994; Yasuda 1996). Jobs are more desirable (Bian 1994; Leenders and 
Gabbay 1999; Lin 1999; Lin, Cook, and Burt 2001). Salaries are higher (Burt 1997, 
1998; Podolny and Baron 1997; Burt, Hogarth, and Michaud 2000; Mehra, Kilduff, 
and Brass 2001; Mizruchi and Sterns 2001). And negative correlations have been 
found with positive performance evaluations, peer reputations, promotions, and good 
ideas (Gabbay 1997; Burt 2001, 2004). Given that this evidence indicates a (negative) 
association between the constraint formula and network benefits, we use constraint as 
an (inverse) indicator for the utility actors can extract from a network. 
 
Dynamic Networks 
What the evidence above does not tell us is whether investments in brokerage 
relations pay off. Burt has suggested, but not shown, that those who remove redundant 
ties and add non-redundant ones will eventually obtain the returns on these 
investments. Current network manipulations that lead to an improved network position 
in the short run may trigger subsequent changes by others that could ultimately make 
oneself worse off. This temporal interdependence in decision-making is not trivial, and 
its examination requires an explicit model. Recently, some models have been proposed  
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to examine such dynamics. There exist already many reviews of models of network 
dynamics. E.g., Weesie and Flap (1990), Doreian and Stokman (1997), Stokman and 
Doreian (2001), and Breiger, Carley, and Pattison (2003) provide extensive overviews 
in sociology. But also within economics and physics this line of research has been 
receiving more and more attention recently (see Dutta and Jackson 2003; Jackson 
2004; Goyal 2006; Newman, Barabási, and Watts 2006).   
We will not review this complete literature on dynamic networks here, but 
rather discuss a class of models that assume that actors optimize a utility function 
through choices in their ego networks (for a similar approach see also Robins, 
Pattison, and Woolcock 2005). We chose this modeling approach, because Burt’s 
network entrepreneurs are precisely such optimizing actors, with brokerage benefits as 
network-derived utility. There exist two subclasses of models of this kind. First, there 
are equilibrium models in which actors simultaneously propose ties to other actors. 
They can select any combination of actors they wish. Actors derive utility from their 
positions in the resulting network. Stable networks are those that are induced by Nash 
equilibria, combinations of strategies that are each a best response to the strategies of 
the other actors. Gould (2002) proposed such a model to explain the emergence of 
status hierarchies. His model is special in the sense that actors are allowed to propose 
a level of attachment to all other actors. Utility depends on this level of attachment, the 
status of the actors that one connects to, and the extent to which attachment is 
reciprocated. A prominent instance of this type of model in economics is Bala and 
Goyal (2000), in which actors can unilaterally link to others and derive utility from the 
number of other actors they are directly or indirectly linked to. 
In both Gould’s model and that of Bala and Goyal, ties are directed (e.g., 
phone calls) and can be established without permission from the target actor.  
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However, Burt’s ties are undirected. We will therefore assume that ties are formed 
only if both actors want to connect. This assumption is based on the idea that relevant 
information can be exchanged only if both actors agree to come together and talk. No 
one can force a tie upon anyone else. Myerson (1991, p. 448) proposed a model that 
uses this assumption. All actors simultaneously propose ties. Ties that are mutually 
proposed are formed, and actors derive utility from the resulting network. This type of 
model, which we will call the Gould-Myerson (GM) model, is attractive but has one 
important drawback: It shortcuts the network dynamics. Instead of representing 
network evolution as a continuous process in which one actor can react to changes by 
other actors elsewhere in the network, it assumes that all actors make their decisions 
simultaneously and that these decisions are binding. There are often numerous 
equilibria, and the lack of a specification of the network evolution process then leaves 
one unable to identify the network that is most likely to evolve. From an evolutionary 
viewpoint, many of these equilibria can hardly be considered stable networks. We will 
show later that we can identify a subset of these equilibria that have more appealing 
stability properties. These stability properties can be explained by describing adaptive 
processes through which actors solve coordination problems and reach specific 
equilibrium networks. The second subclass of actor-oriented models of network 
formation does specify such network evolution processes. 
In sociology, Snijders (1996, 2001) develops methods for the statistical 
analysis of longitudinal network data. These models allow one to test hypotheses on 
the specific utility function that actors optimize when making changes to the network. 
Snijders’ statistical model has been applied to, for example, the emergence and 
stability of friendship networks (Zeggelink, Stokman, and Van der Bunt 1996; Van der 
Bunt, Van Duijn, and Snijders 1999; Whitmeyer 2002). The model assumes that actors 
are randomly selected one by one and given the opportunity to remove or add one tie.  
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Actors then evaluate whether some change increases their utility. If so, they make that 
change; if not, they leave the network as it is. Originally, the model assumed that tie 
formation was unilateral, and thus each actor could force a tie upon some other actor. 
These ties were directed. In the latest versions of Snijders’ models, one can also 
specify a model in which ties are undirected and formed only if both actors want that 
tie. This particular scenario was implied by Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) concept of 
“pairwise stability, ” and later developed by Watts (2001). A network is pairwise 
stable if no pair of actors wishes to connect and no single actor wishes to remove a tie. 
Sequential tie formation under mutual consent reaches stasis only once a pairwise 
stable network has formed. In this type of model, which we will call the Snijders-
Watts (SW) model, actors are myopic; they do not consider what other actors will 
change after they make a change themselves. In the GM model, by contrast, the actors 
consider all other actors’ possible actions in a setting in which everyone chooses all 
desired ties simultaneously and only once. We will show in the next section that the 
SW and GM models can usefully be unified despite these differences, namely through 
a single equilibrium concept that applies to both. 
 
A Model of Network Entrepreneurship 
Burt’s (1992) network entrepreneurs are actors who change structure in pursuit 
of greater network-derived benefits. We can use the explicit formula that Burt used to 
quantify an actor’s lack of network benefits, the aforementioned constraint measure. 
Through alterations of their network positions, actors maximize utility, which should 
be decreasing with the score of that individual on the constraint measure. The 
literature provides two candidate models for such network entrepreneurship, the GM 
model and the SW model. As we will show now, these models can be unified.   
  26
  We first introduce the necessary notation. Let n ≥ 2 be the number of actors, 
{} n N ,..., 2 , 1 =  the set of actors, and X the n times n adjacency matrix with xij 
indicating the presence or absence of a connection between i and j. Actor i’s degree is 
denoted by  ∑ =
j
ij i x d . 
  In the GM model, each actor proposes whom he wants to be connected to. We 
use si ∈ {0,1}
n to indicate a pure strategy of actor i in which sij indicates whether or 
not i proposes a link with j. Because actors cannot connect to themselves, sii = 0. The 
utility function ui(s) assigns a numerical value to each set of strategies s = {si | i ∈ N}. 
Gould considers Nash equilibrium as the stability concept. 
 
Definition 1. A set of strategies s* = {si* | i ∈ N} is a Nash equilibrium if ui(s*) ≥ 
ui(si, s*-i) for all i and si, where s*-i  is the set of all strategies in s* excluding the one 
of i.  
 
Moreover, Burt’s ties are non-reflexive, so xii = 0 for all i, they are undirected, 
so xij = xji for all i and j, and they are unvalued, so xij ∈ {0, 1}. Let g
N denote the 
complete network of all non-reflexive, undirected, and unvalued connections ij. Let g 
+ ij denote network g with the tie ij added to it and g − ij network g with tie ij 
removed. We say that the set of strategies s induces the network g if ij ∈ g ⇔ sij = sji = 
1; i.e., only ties that are proposed by both actors are part of the network. The network 
constraint formula depends only on the network formed and not on the ties proposed. 
Therefore, we assume that proposing ties is costless. This implies that the utility 
function ui(s) is the same for combinations of strategies that induce the same network. 
Formally, the utility function has the property that ui(s’) = ui(s’’) if s’ and s’’ induce 
the same network g. With some abuse of notation, we can also write ui(g) as the utility  
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of a certain network g, given that it does not matter what strategies induce this 
network. Specifying the model for our purposes, actor i’s utility is a decreasing 
function of the constraint measure ci as indicated above, e.g., ui(g) = − ci(g).
3 
Now, we define as a first stability concept the Nash network:  
 
Definition 2. A network g* is a Nash network if some s* inducing g* is a Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
Nash network is a rather weak stability concept for undirected networks, since 
many networks that can hardly be considered stable are included. The problem is that 
if one actor does not propose a tie to another, the second actor has no incentive to 
propose a tie to the first, because a tie is formed only if it is proposed by both actors at 
the same time. No one can increase his utility through any proposal if no one else is 
proposing ties, which makes “nobody proposing any tie” a Nash equilibrium. The 
network induced by this set of strategies is the empty network, and this is a Nash 
network. Given our utility function, every pair of actors wants to initiate the first tie in 
the empty network, because isolates have the lowest possible utility. Thus, many Nash 
equilibria are due to trivial coordination problems. 
In the SW model, such coordination problems do not exist. This model asks 
what an actor would change given the current status of the network if he were offered 
                                                 
3 We make the strong assumption here that reducing network constraint is the only utility argument for 
all actors and that the utility derived from a lack of constraint is the same for all actors. We thereby 
neglect other utility arguments related to, e.g., closure (Burt 2005, ch. 3) and indirect brokerage (Burt 
2007). Neither do we investigate the effects of heterogeneity among actors (see Burt 2005, ch. 1.4). We 
will consider these issues in more detail in the discussion section. Note that utility should be interpreted 
here as the extent to which an actor is expected to be able to extract benefits from the network. A 
network position is not considered beneficial in itself.   
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that possibility. An actor is allowed to delete a tie or add a tie with permission from 
the new contact; i.e., it does not make this other actor worse off. Stability is reached if 
no actor can profitably delete a tie or add an acceptable tie. Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996) call this pairwise stability: 
 
Definition 3. A network g is pairwise stable if both 
(i) F o r  a l l   ,    () ( ) () ( ) ii j j ij g u g u g ij u g u g ij ∈≥ − ∧ ≥ −  and 
(ii)  ,     () ( )() ( ) . For all ii j j ij g u g ij u g u g ij u g ∉+ > ⇒ + <  
 
Condition (i) states that no actor wants to sever a tie, and condition (ii) states 
that no pair of actors wishes to add a tie. On the one hand, pairwise stability has the 
advantage that pairs of actors can add ties if they both want to have a tie, which seems 
a clear indication that a network is unstable, since networks can be Nash networks 
despite this possibility. On the other hand, the disadvantage of pairwise stability is that 
it does not consider the simultaneous removal of multiple ties. If an actor would profit 
from removing two ties, this network could never be a Nash network in the GM game, 
because not proposing these two ties would have been a better strategy. Networks can 
be pairwise stable despite profitable deviations that involve multiple ties, even though 
such deviations arguably make a network less stable. Thus, Nash networks in the GM 
model and pairwise stable networks in the SW model both contain a subset of 
networks that could be considered unstable.  
That makes the intersection of these two sets of networks a candidate for an 
appropriate set of stable networks. Goyal and Joshi (2006) introduced the concept of 
pairwise equilibrium or pairwise Nash in the GM model, which corresponds to the 
intersection of Nash networks and pairwise stable networks (see also Cálvo-Armengol  
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2004). Gilles et al. (2006) call the same stability concept strong pairwise stability 
using the SW model. In words, pairwise Nash networks are networks in which (i) no 
actor wants to delete a subset of his ties and (ii) no pair of actors wants to add a tie 
between them. But clearly, there is an asymmetry here: An actor can delete all his ties 
but add only one tie – if that tie does not make the other actor worse off. 
Even more problematic is the assumption that actors do not simultaneously add 
and delete ties. For example, pairwise Nash implies that an actor does not contemplate 
improving his network position by replacing one contact with another. This, however, 
seems a rather straightforward change in a network. To resolve the problems of 
asymmetry and non-simultaneity in the deletion and addition of ties, we introduce our 
own stability concept, “unilateral stability.” In our definition of this concept we use 
the concept of “unilateral obtainability”: 
 
Definition 4. A network g’ is unilaterally obtainable from g by i through S ⊆ N \{i} if  
(i)  all ties that are in g’ but were not in g involve actor i and an actor in S; 
(ii) all ties that are not in g’ but were in g involve actor i.  
 
In other words, one network is unilaterally obtainable from another by a 
proposing actor i and through a subgroup S, if each tie that is added or deleted 
involves actor i and if each tie that is added involves also a member of S. Now, we can 
define our core stability concept. 
 
Definition 5. A network g is unilaterally stable if for all i, S ⊆ N \{i}, and g’ 
unilaterally obtainable from g by i through S, ui(g’) > ui(g) ⇒ uj(g’) < uj(g) for some j 
∈ S.  
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In words, a network is called unilaterally stable if no actor i can change the ties 
that he is involved in himself such that two conditions are fulfilled: (i) i is strictly 
better off; (2) none of the actors in S to whom actor i proposes a new tie is worse off 
than in the original network. From the definitions, it is clear that all unilaterally stable 
networks are pairwise Nash, and all pairwise Nash networks are pairwise stable. 
Unilateral stability unites the JWS and GM models as follows. It is a stability 
concept in the JWS model. It is conceptualized as convergence in a sequential process. 
It can also be formulated as a refinement of Nash equilibrium in the GM model, in 
which case we refer to “initiative proof” Nash equilibria (see AUTHOR 2006). 
Reformulated as such, it constitutes equilibrium in simultaneous decision-making. 
 
Networks of Structural Entrepreneurs 
We now identify networks to which no entrepreneur can profitably make any 
further change. Our first result states that two actors will always connect if they have 
no shared contacts. 
 
Theorem 1. Adding a tie without creating closed triads is always beneficial for both 
actors involved in the new tie.  
 
Proof. For purposes of legibility, we moved all proofs to the Appendix. 
 
Theorem 1 establishes the unconditional benefits from brokerage. If an actor 
adds a tie without creating a closed triad, then this actor will be on the shortest path 
between the new contact and all the contacts the actor already had. And vice versa, the  
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new partner comes to mediate the information the focal actor receives and passes this 
along to his old contacts. Scores on the constraint measures of both actors drop. The 
added value of an additional tie decreases as more ties are added because an actor has 
to distribute his time among more neighbors and can thus broker less information per 
pair of neighbors, but this marginal utility never becomes zero. 
  As we will see below, the reverse of theorem 1 is not true. Sometimes actors 
want to add ties that cause closed triads, and networks with triads can even be pairwise 
stable. We did not encounter any unilaterally stable network with closed triads, but we 
could not prove that they do not exist. 
 
Corollary 1. The shortest path between any pair of actors in a pairwise stable network 
has length less than or equal to 2. 
 
The shortest path between two actors can be of length 2 or less only if both 
actors are directly connected or can reach each other through a broker. If neither 
condition obtains for some pair of actors, then these actors can add a tie without 
creating a closed triad, which is profitable by theorem 1. Note that since pairwise 
stability is a weaker stability concept than unilateral stability, corollary 1 also holds 
for unilaterally stable networks. 
 
Corollary 2. A network of disconnected parts cannot be pairwise stable. 
 
A network of disconnected parts contains many brokerage opportunities. Every 
entrepreneur wants to add a tie to someone in another part because that tie will never 
create a closed triad. Such networks can therefore not be pairwise stable (and, 
consequently, not unilaterally stable, either). The following set of definitions describes  
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a family of networks that includes important stable networks. 
 
Definition 6.  
•  An m-partite network is a network in which the actors can be divided into m 
groups such that there are no ties within these groups.  
•  The complete m-partite network  , ,..., 12 nn n m K is the m-partite network in which all 
the possible ties between the actors in the m groups, which have sizes n1, n2, 
…,  nm (see Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 120). The complete 3-partite 
network K2,2,2 (or Octahedron) is shown in figure 3.3. 
•  A balanced m-partite network is an m-partite network such that the difference 
between the number of actors in the largest group and the number of actors in 
the smallest group is at most 1. 
•  If  m = 2, m-partite networks are called bipartite networks. The balanced 
complete bipartite network K3,3 is shown in figure 3.3. 
•  If m > 2, m-partite networks are called multipartite networks. 
•  The complete bipartite network K1,k is also called the k-star. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Two Example Networks 
 
K3,3     K2,2,2 
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Now we can formulate the following corollary of theorem 1.  
 
Corollary 3. Pairwise stable networks that are bipartite networks are necessarily 
complete bipartite networks (otherwise some actors are at a distance greater than 2 and 
one can add ties without creating closed triads). 
 
Corollary 3 says that in order for a bipartite network to be stable, it will have to 
be complete. Otherwise there would be a brokerage opportunity. As the reader can 
verify, eliminating any tie in the first network in figure 3.2 makes both actors involved 
in that tie worse off: Actor A would have constraint ⅓ instead of ¼, and the other 
actor would become an isolate. The next result states that the first network in figure 
3.2 is not pairwise Nash, despite its completeness. 
 
Theorem 2. A complete bipartite network of size n is pairwise Nash, unless it is a k-
star with k > 3. 
 
Theorem 2 identifies an important class of pairwise Nash networks, and thus 
also of pairwise stable networks.
4 As soon as both groups in a bipartite network 
consist of at least two actors and the network is complete, it is pairwise stable. The 
first network in figure 3.2 is a 4-star, and by theorem 2 it is not pairwise stable. The 
reason is that any two peripheral actors may wish to connect: B and C lower their 
constraint from 1 to 61/64 if they connect, even though this tie is creates a closed triad. 
This is a property of Burt’s constraint formula. In some cases, when the broker has 
many ties and can therefore spend little time passing information, it is better to 
                                                 
4 All bipartite networks, incomplete and complete, are Nash networks. Restricting oneself to the 
pairwise Nash networks excludes the incomplete bipartite networks. This avoids claiming that a 
network is stable only because two actors do not succeed in coordinating their proposals for a certain tie 
they both want to have.  
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establish a direct connection. This is what happens in this example network. B and C 
connect because A spends too much time with D and E. The middle network in figure 
3.2 evolves. Given the argument for instability of larger stars, it is surprising that in 
other unbalanced complete bipartite networks actors in the larger groups never have an 
incentive to connect. If one broker can be too busy, then why cannot two?  
Complete bipartite networks have another nice property, namely that they are 
efficient in the Pareto sense.  
 
Definition 7. A network is Pareto-efficient if there is no other network such that no 
actor is worse off and at least one actor is better off. 
 
If our actors could cooperate and enforce agreements – which we have 
assumed they cannot – then they would not be able to leave a Pareto-efficient network. 
There would always be some actor vetoing a transition. The following theorem tells us 
that the class of stable networks identified in theorem 2 is Pareto-efficient. 
 
Theorem 3. Complete bipartite networks are Pareto-efficient. 
 
We could not prove the reverse of theorem 3, namely that complete bipartite 
networks are the only efficient networks. We verified that there do not exist other 
Pareto-efficient networks that involve 8 or fewer actors. 
  We now specify a necessary and sufficient condition under which complete 
bipartite networks are not only pairwise stable but also unilaterally stable. 
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Theorem 4. A complete bipartite network is unilaterally stable if and only if it is 
balanced. 
 
Theorems 3 and 4 together identify a class of networks that are efficient and 
stable under the strictest stability condition. In a balanced complete bipartite network, 
no actor can profit from deleting and adding permitted ties or be made better off in any 
network, whether unilaterally obtainable or non-obtainable, without another actor 
being made worse off. We were able to identify a second class of pairwise stable 
networks. 
 
Theorem 5. All complete multipartite networks are pairwise stable if the groups are of 
equal size and contain more than one actor. 
 
One example of a network that meets the requirement of theorem 5 is the six-
actor complete 3-partite network K2,2,2 (see figure 3.3). This network is neither 
unilaterally stable nor pairwise Nash. If an actor deletes two ties, then the actor’s 
constraint drops from 9/16 to 1/2. The network is nevertheless pairwise stable because 
if an actor is allowed to delete only a single tie, he prefers to keep it. His constraint 
then increases to 43/72. Because the deletion of two ties makes an actor better off, this 
network is not a Nash equilibrium of this game using the GM-model. Therefore, this is 
also an indication that pairwise stability might be a bit too weak a stability concept. 
Moreover, the K2,2,2 is extremely inefficient. All actors would fare better in the K3,3, 
which gives each actor constraint ⅓. More generally, this class of complete 
multipartite networks consists of Pareto-inefficient pairwise stable networks. 
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Simulation 
We have identified two main classes of pairwise stable networks to which 
structural entrepreneurship might give rise. First, complete bipartite networks in which 
there are no redundant ties, and, if Burt’s constraint formula correctly quantifies 
brokerage benefits, they are Pareto-efficient. No alternative network makes one actor 
better off without making another worse off. Second, in the multipartite networks of 
theorem 5, all pairs are brokered, and in addition, the majority of pairs are directly 
connected. The latter networks contain many redundant ties and are consequently 
Pareto-inefficient. Every actor would fare better in the balanced complete bipartite 
network of the same size. Yet these multipartite networks are pairwise stable. No 
entrepreneur can profitably delete a single tie and no pair of actors can profitably add a 
single tie. 
  On the basis of our analysis, we could expect either type of network – or yet 
another – to arise in a world in which entrepreneurs pursue access and control benefits 
by changing ties one by one. Simulating such a world enables us to investigate which 
of the two types of networks is more likely to emerge. Such simulations also help us 
identify potential pairwise stable structures that the two classes of networks mentioned 
above do not cover.  
The simulation we built executes the following steps: 
1.  Start from some network. 
2.  Randomly select one actor who is allowed either to delete a tie or to add a 
tie if he can count on the consent of the actor to whom he wants to add a 
tie. 
3.  The actor considers his ties in a random order. For each absent or present 
tie an actor considers, there are two possibilities:  
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a.  The actor makes a mistake with probability 1 – (1 − noise)
1/(n-1). In 
case of an absent tie, he adds it if adding increases his constraint 
and removes it if adding it would reduce his constraint. In case of a 
present ties, he removes the tie if this increases his constraint and 
keeps it if removing would decrease his constraint. Mistaken 
additions do not require consent. If a tie is proposed by mistake, it 
is always accepted. After any mistake, the simulation returns to step 
2.  
b.  With probability (1 − noise)
1/(n-1), the actor does not make a 
mistake; if he has the tie and his constraint decreases when he 
would remove that tie he does so. otherwise not; while if his 
constraint decreases if he adds the tie, while he does not have it and 
the other actor agrees with the change (the other actor’s constraint 
does not increase), then he will add the tie. After a tie change, the 
simulation returns to step 2. If the actor does not change this tie, 
step 3 is repeated until either the actor finds a tie that he can 
profitably change, or he makes a mistake, or he has considered all 
his ties without seeing any possibility to decrease his constraint. 
The noise-level is varied from 0 (no mistakes) to 0.3 in steps of 
0.1.
5 
4.  Repeat steps 2 and 3 until no actor can profitably delete or, with consent, 
add a tie, and every actor has reconsidered all his ties without making a 
mistake.  
Networks that are formed after this simulation process stops are necessarily pairwise 
                                                 
5 We chose the probability for a mistake such that an actor does not make a mistake with probability ((1 
− noise)
1/(n−1))
(n−1) = (1 − noise) after considering all his ties. Thus, he makes a mistake with a 
probability “noise”, which we will call the noise-level.  
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stable; otherwise they could not have passed step 4. We first ran such simulations 
starting with each of the 13,597 non-isomorphic networks of sizes 2 through 8 without 
noise. This allowed us to identify all pairwise stable networks for these network sizes, 
since simulations starting from pairwise stable networks without noise end instantly. 
We drew a sub-sample of networks stratified on density for network size n = 9 through 
25. We decreased the number of networks per network density for larger network 
sizes, in order to have comparable numbers of networks per network size. In this way, 
we attempt to minimize bias toward networks of a particular density while keeping the 
set feasibly small (for a complete overview of the sampling procedure, see AUTHOR 
2005). For each emerging pairwise stable network, we checked whether it was 
pairwise Nash or unilaterally stable as well. 
Table 1 shows the numbers of stable networks by network size and stability 
concept. Figure 3.4 displays the Pentagon, the Wheel, and other pairwise stable 
networks that do not belong to one of the two general classes mentioned above. For n 
= 2, we have the connected pair (or 1-star) as the only pairwise stable network. For n = 
3, the 2-star is the only pairwise stable network. For n = 4, the K2,2 and the 3-star are 
the pairwise stable networks. For n = 5, there are two pairwise stable networks, the 
Pentagon (see figure 3.4) and the K2,3, which are both unilaterally stable. For n = 6, 
there are four pairwise stable networks: the K2,4 and the K3,3 as well as the “Bag” (see 
figure 3.4) and the K2,2,2. The K2,2,2 is not pairwise Nash, and only the K3,3 is 
unilaterally stable. For n = 7, there are three pairwise stable networks, the K2,5, the 
K3,4, and the PS2
1
,3
6 (see figure 3.4, the name indicates the degree-distribution, i.e., 
there is one actor with two ties and six with three ties). The K3,4 is also unilaterally 
stable. For n = 8, there are ten pairwise stable networks: the K2,6, the K3,5, the K4,4, the 
Wheel (see figure 3.4), the K2,2,2,2, and five other networks that can be found in figure 
3.4. The three densest networks, including the K2,2,2,2, are not pairwise Nash. The  
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Wheel is the second unilaterally stable network for n = 8, in addition to the K4,4. It is a 
regular structure in which everyone has three ties and occupies a regularly equivalent 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, pp. 473–4) position with all the others. 
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Figure 3.4. Other Pairwise Stable Networks 
 
In addition, we checked which of the more than 12 million non-isomorphic 
networks of sizes 9 and 10 fulfilled a specific stability condition. In this way, we 
found 9 pairwise stable networks for n = 9 and 14 pairwise stable networks for n = 10.  
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The unilaterally stable structures for n = 10 are the K5,5 and another network in which 
every actor has four ties. Finally, for sizes 11 through 25, we checked whether the 
networks that resulted from the simulations were pairwise Nash or unilaterally stable 
as well. The results are also summarized in table 1. For network sizes larger than 10, it 
is not guaranteed that every stable network has been found, because not all starting 
networks were considered.
6 In fact, we know from the analytical results that some 
networks that we did not find in the simulations are nevertheless pairwise stable. Still, 
these results show that the number of pairwise stable networks per network size is 
very small and increases only slowly with network size. There is no network size for 
which we identified more than two unilaterally stable networks, which suggests that 
the relative number of unilaterally stable networks increases even less with network 
size than the number of pairwise stable networks.  
The additional unilaterally stable networks that we found fall into two classes 
that the simulation enabled us to discover. First, networks with a number of actors that 
is a multiple of 5, say 5m, and that are generalizations of the Pentagon. The actors are 
divided into 5 equally sized groups and the groups are organized in a Pentagon. There 
are no ties within these groups but all actors are connected with all actors in the two 
neighboring groups around the Pentagon. The second network in figure 3.5 is the 
example with 10 actors. In these networks every actor has 2m ties, which makes them 
inefficient. By comparison, in the balanced complete bipartite network of the same 
size, which is also void of closed triads, an actor has approximately 2.5m ties and 
therefore a lower score on the constraint measure. The second additional class of 
unilaterally stable networks are networks with a number of actors that is a multiple of 
8, say 8m actors. The actors are divided into 8 groups of size m, and these groups are 
                                                 
6 Checking all structures for n = 10 took about 5 days with our software and computers, which implies 
that for n = 11 it would take about 500 days.  
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ordered along a circle. All actors are then connected to all actors in the two 
neighboring groups as well as to all actors in the group right across the circle. There 
are no ties within the groups. The third network in figure 3.5 is the example with 16 
actors. These networks are generalizations of the Wheel in figure 3.4. Each actor has 
3m ties in these networks, which is clearly inefficient if we compare it with the 
balanced complete bipartite network in which each actor has 4m ties. We found the 
cases m = 1 and m = 2 as results of simulations on which we report below, but not the 
24-actor network with m = 3.
7 
We varied the noise-level to investigate the extent to which our results depend 
on whether actors sometimes make mistakes in their decisions. We ran more noise-
levels and more replications of the same starting network and noise-level for small 
networks to obtain more reliable estimates of the likelihoods to converge to a specific 
structure. To maintain feasibility we reduced the number of repetitions as well as the 
noise-levels for larger networks. One can also see from the results that variations with 
noise are smaller for larger networks. The complete overview is provided in table 2. 
Convergence to pairwise stability always occurs, and it does so reasonably fast 
although time to convergence increases quickly with noise. For n = 25, the maximum 
number of iterations to reach a pairwise stable network is 347 without noise, but the 
iterations exceed 3000 for n = 16 and a noise-level of 0.2.
8  
 
                                                 
7 The formal proof that these two classes of networks are unilaterally stable is even more laborious than 
the proof of theorem 4, because more different situations have to be distinguished. The proof is 
available from the authors, but not added to the appendix because it does not provide substantially new 
insights. We thank Jurjen Kamphorst for assistance in completing this proof. 
8 We did not extend the analyses to larger networks for three reasons. First, the patterns of the results 
are clear and change only gradually while network size is increasing. Therefore, increasing size to 
networks with 30 or even 40 actors would not lead to substantially new insights. Second, simulation 
time increases exponentially with network size, which makes running a considerable number of starting 
networks with 50 or more actors infeasible.  
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Table 3.1. Number of Stable Networks by Size and Criterion 
 
n 
Non-isomorphic 
networks  Connected 
Pairwise 
Stable 
Pairwise 
Nash 
Unilaterally stable 
(degree distribution for 
non-bipartite networks) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
2 
4 
11 
34 
156 
1044 
12346 
274668 
12.01e6 
1
2
6
21
112
853
11117
261080
11.72e6
1
1
2
2
4
3
10
9
14
1
1
2
2
3
3
7
7
9
1 
1 
1 
(5 times 2)  2 
1 
1 
(8 times 3)  2 
1 
(10 times 4)  2 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
10.19e8 
16.51e10 
50.50e12 
29.05e15 
31.43e18 
64.00e21 
24.59e25 
17.88e29 
24.64e33 
64.55e37 
32.22e42 
30.71e47 
55.99e52 
19.57e58 
13.13e64 
10.07e8
16.41e10
50.34e12
29.00e15
31.40e18
63.97e21
24.59e25
17.87e29
24.64e33
64.55e37
32.22e42
30.71e47
55.99e52
19.57e58
13.13e64
15
27
14
20
26
28
25
33
35
40
43
48
58
58
68
10
12
7
10
13
16
14
21
18
25
24
26
31
28
31
1 
1 
1 
1 
 (15 times 6)  2 
 (16 times 6)  2 
1 
1 
1 
(20 times 8)  2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
   (25 times 10)  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balanced Complete Bipartite  Generalized Pentagon           Generalized Wheel 
Figure 3.5. Three Classes of Unilaterally Stable Networks  
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Examining the entire range of n from size 2 through 25 in table 3, we can make 
several important observations. The number of pairwise stable networks increases as n 
increases, although not entirely monotonically. For any size, the number of pairwise 
stable networks is small compared to the total number of networks of that size. The 
balanced complete bipartite network is by far the most likely to emerge from the 
simulations. The less equal the group sizes of a complete bipartite network are, the 
less likely it emerges in the simulation. Table 3 shows the proportions of simulations 
from which the most equal and the second most equal complete bipartite networks 
emerge as pairwise stable networks. These two networks cover more than 90% of the 
resulting networks for n > 9 without noise and for all n except n = 5 and n = 7 if there 
is enough noise. If n is odd, the balanced complete bipartite network alone even 
accounts for over 80% of the resulting pairwise stable networks except for n = 7. 
There are no other pairwise stable networks that obtain in a large proportion of 
simulations (especially with noise) except for the Pentagon (19%) and the PS2
1
,3
6 for n 
= 7 (32%). For n ≥ 8, no other network occurs in more than 4% of the simulations 
although the complete bipartite networks that are two steps from balanced gain some 
territory for larger even-sized networks. The other unilaterally stable networks that are 
not bipartite do not emerge in substantially larger percentages than other pairwise 
stable networks (except for the Pentagon). The Wheel, for example, occurs in only 1% 
of the simulations for n = 8. Complete multipartite networks are obtained in only a 
negligible number of cases. 
It turns out that adding noise to the dynamical process increases the likelihood 
that a network converges to a complete bipartite network, especially to a balanced 
complete bipartite network. This appears especially true for small networks.  
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Table 3.2. Simulation Design 
 
Network size  
n 
Number of repetition per 
network and per noise level
Noise-levels 
2 – 3  4  0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
4 – 5  250  0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
6  25  0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
7 – 8  4  0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
9 – 16  2  0, 0.1, and 0.2 
17 – 25  2  0 and 0.1 
 
Table 3.3. Simulation Results  
 
n Number  of 
starting 
networks 
% Balanced complete 
bipartite ( /2 /2 nn K
⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ ) 
% (2 ) / 2 (2 ) / 2 nn K −+ ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥  Occurrence of other 
networks at highest noise 
level 
  noise 0 0.1  0.2  0.3 0 0.1  0.2 0.3   
2  2  1 1 1 1  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  no  other 
3 4  1  1  1  1  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  no  other 
4  11  .79 .83 .85 .87 .21 .17 .15 .13  no  other 
5 34  .80  .82  .82  .80  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Pentagon:  .20 
6  156  .70 .76 .83 .84 .13 .10 .07 .06  Bag:    .09 
7  1044  .52 .62 .68 .68 .02 .01 .00 .00  PS2
1
,3
6: .32 
8  12346  .61 .70 .80 .86 .12 .12 .10 .07 PS2
1
,3
4
,4
3, PS3
6
,4
2: .03
 
9  9292  .86 .92 .96 n.a. .01 .01 .01  .01  PS3
2
,4
7: .02 
10  10070  .68 .72 .73 n.a. .24 .25 .26 n.a.  none  >  .01 
11  10898  .91 .95 .97 n.a. .03 .03 .02 n.a.  none  >  .01 
12  10930  .61 .64 .70 n.a. .33 .33 .30 n.a.  none  >  .01 
13  5078  .88 .92 .96 n.a. .07 .06 .04 n.a.  none  >  .01 
14  5700  .57 .61 .70 n.a. .35 .35 .30 n.a.  none  >  .01 
15  6358  .86 .90 .94 n.a. .07 .07 .05 n.a.  none  >  .01 
16  7062  .58 .61 .63 n.a. .35 .35 .36 n.a.  none  >  .01 
17  2346  .86 .90 n.a. n.a. .09 .07 n.a. n.a.  none  >  .01 
18  2666  .55 .58 n.a. n.a. .39 .38 n.a. n.a.  K7,11: .01 
19  3006  .85 .88 n.a. n.a. .10 .09 n.a. n.a.  none  >  .01 
20  3366  .53 .55 n.a. n.a. .42 .42 n.a. n.a.  K8,12: .01 
21  3746  .84 .86 n.a. n.a. .13 .12 n.a. n.a.  none  >  .01 
22  4146  .52 .54 n.a. n.a. .41 .42 n.a. n.a.  K9,13: .02 
23  4566  .82 .83 n.a. n.a. .14 .15 n.a. n.a.  none  >  .01 
24  5006  .50 .50 n.a. n.a. .43 .44 n.a. n.a.  K10,14: .04 
25  5466  .80 .81 n.a. n.a. .16 .16 n.a. n.a.  none  >  .01  
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  Additional analyses show that it is very unlikely that our main results depend 
on the set of starting networks. Since we used all possible structures for n < 9, we 
reweighed our results by counting every network with the number of isomorphic 
structures that exist for this network.
9 In this way, we obtain statistics that resemble 
statistics for starting from a random network. It turns out that table 3 would hardly 
change despite such a rather drastic reweighing of cases. In addition, the correlation 
that does exist between the density of the starting networks and the density of the 
resulting networks is small for simulations without noise and completely disappears 
by adding noise. 
  Although only a bit more than half of the pairwise stable networks we 
discovered in the simulations are also pairwise Nash, it turns out that virtually all 
simulations (98.5% without noise, up to 99.8% with noise = 0.3) end in a pairwise 
Nash network. The dominant equilibrium is the balanced complete bipartite network – 
an efficient and egalitarian network. This result is robust throughout all analyzed 
network sizes and all noise levels.  
 
Discussion 
We have attempted to explicitly model Burt’s network entrepreneurship: 
Optimize relationships in terms of brokerage opportunities, initiate relationships with 
others who are otherwise unconnected, and resolve relationships if they are redundant 
in terms of access and control benefits. More specifically, we have assumed that 
everyone tries to minimize his “network constraint,” Burt’s measure for brokerage. 
We then answered the question “What networks will evolve?” 
In short, the answer is balanced complete bipartite networks. These networks 
                                                 
9 Numbers of isomorphisms were determined using Nauty 2.2 (see McKay 1990).  
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consist of two groups of similar size with all inter-group ties and no intra-group ties 
present. Such networks meet the strongest stability criterion, most simulations 
generated such networks, and this result was robust across noise levels and network 
sizes. The balanced complete bipartite network strongly contrasts with the networks 
commonly depicted in the literature as outcomes of entrepreneurial activity. Burt’s 
typical example of what a network looks like after entrepreneurial activity has taken 
place is that of one actor brokering multiple dense, otherwise separated groups (figure 
4.1). Moreover, it contrasts with some economic models of network dynamics in 
information and communication settings that identify stars as the stable networks.  
The difference between these networks is considerable not only in terms of 
structure, but also in the distribution of benefits among the entrepreneurs. Burt’s 
single-broker structure and the star are both winner-take-all networks. Balanced 
complete bipartite networks, by contrast, are egalitarian. They benefit each 
entrepreneur equally. 
Balanced complete bipartite networks have other interesting properties. No one 
really is a broker. Even though each entrepreneur attempts to occupy a brokering 
position, in these equilibria, two-step information flow between any two persons 
travels through at least ½ (n – 1) third parties. Thus, betweenness centrality (Freeman 
1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994: 189-191) is not particularly high for any single 
actor. Moreover, although everybody has a low network constraint, which makes these 
networks efficient, no one has a substantial comparative advantage over anyone else.  
The other three classes of stable networks that we identified, namely, 
symmetric multipartite networks, generalizations of the Pentagon, and generalizations 
of the Wheel, are all egalitarian as well. Every actor is equally well off. In addition, 
these networks are inefficient in terms of their network constraint. Especially the even-
sized multipartite networks that are divided in n/2 groups of size 2 have numerous  
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redundant relationships despite their pairwise stability. The generalizations of the 
Pentagon and the Wheel, by contrast, are inefficient due to sparseness. Balanced 
complete bipartite networks of the same size give each actor more non-redundant ties 
and no redundant ties. 
Another property of balanced complete bipartite networks is that they are not 
stars. Economists have also recently modeled network dynamics as a process in which 
actors maximize information-based utility. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and 
Goyal (2000), and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007), using three distinct utility 
functions, all find the star to be the dominant equilibrium network. Goyal and Vega-
Redondo even contend that their utility function is a measurement for the richness of 
structural holes in someone’s network. Their model does not use the constraint 
measure as proposed by Burt (2005). A theoretical reason for the difference between 
the two models is that control benefits are not subject to decay over longer paths in 
Goyal and Vega-Redondo’s model. This implies that brokerage of indirectly received 
information is as valuable as brokerage of directly received information. By contrast, 
Burt’s constraint measure implies that brokerage of information one receives 
indirectly is worthless, and only brokering directly received information creates value. 
Although both assumptions are quite extreme, we choose to insist strictly on using the 
constraint measure for three reasons. Actors who take indirect brokerage benefits into 
account must have information on the structure of the entire network. Their model is 
thus scope-limited to settings in which such information is readily available. The 
actors in our model need to know only which of their contacts are in contact with one 
another and which not and how many relations their direct contacts have in the 
network. Second, the constraint measure has empirically been shown to explain 
success (see the evidence discussed on page 6). And third, Burt (2007) demonstrates in 
a recent paper that the returns on indirect brokerage are in some contexts not visible at  
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all, and if they are found, they are considerably smaller than returns on direct 
brokerage. This provides empirical evidence for an aspect of the constraint measure 
that is quite crucial for our results, namely that there is no negative effect of 
redundancy of information that travels over more than two actors. The other studies do 
not have a body of empirical evidence to back up their utility functions. 
Still, that different formalizations of theoretically the same concept yield such 
different results begs the question, How robust are our results for changes in 
assumptions on the utility function? Three properties of the network constraint are 
crucial for our finding. First, network ties are in principle cheap, so if they are well 
chosen, one wants as many ties as possible. Second, closed triads are bad, so that you 
almost never want to create a tie if it closes a triad. Third, effects of actors that are at a 
distance larger than 2 are neglected, e.g., redundancy of information that travels over 
longer distances is not considered as causing a more constrained network position. 
These three properties are maintained if one changes the utility function to be 
decreasing not in the absolute but in the relative constraint score, i.e. his absolute 
constraint divided by the sum of the absolute constraints of the other actors. This 
alternative measure would be applicable to settings in which benefits are arguably 
zero-sum, such as in Burt’s example of promotions – if only one out of a pool of 
candidates can be promoted. We analyzed and simulated a model with this alternative 
utility function,. Results were very similar. Also under this utility function, the 
balanced complete bipartite networks are the dominant stable networks. They are 
pairwise stable and emerge in the majority of simulations. 
In Burger and Buskens (2006), the utility function is reduced to its basic 
principles, namely, there are (marginally decreasing) benefits of having ties with 
others and costs for closed triads. This much more simple utility function, which also  
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has the three properties mentioned above, led to complete bipartite networks as the 
most prominent class of networks to emerge and also with a higher likelihood for 
balanced complete bipartite networks. 
In addition, Robins et al. (2005) find in a stochastic network evolution context 
that networks converge to the networks we also predict if they introduce a low 
probability that closed triads are formed and relatively small costs for having ties in 
general. Their figure 12 (Robins et al. 2005, p. 931) shows two representations of a 
complete bipartite network (the top one is balanced), which indicates that even with 
changed other parameters as long as triads are unlikely enough and direct relations are 
likely enough, also in this set-up complete bipartite networks emerge. Our conclusions 
would also not change, if we would add indirect constraint as is done by Burt (2007) – 
i.e., an actor’s indirect constraint is the average of the constraints of his neighbors – 
we would still find the same networks to be stable because indirect constraint is 
optimized, given that each individual constraint is optimized.  
The main results of our paper will change if we change one of the three crucial 
properties mentioned above. First, results change if we take into account redundancy 
over two steps; i.e., there is limited new information in multiple contacts if these are 
linked to many of the same third parties (see Reagans and Zuckerman 2006 for a 
detailed account of this type of redundancy). Complete bipartite networks are full of 
such redundancies over two steps and, therefore, unlikely to be stable if such 
redundancies are taken into account. Second, if relations are so expensive that actors 
do not want to connect to at least half of the group, clearly complete bipartite networks 
will no longer be stable. If this were the only change to the utility function, networks 
would remain to stabilize in bipartite structures, but these structures would not be 
complete. Third, stability results will – obviously – change if we do not assume that  
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closed triads are costly but rather that actors value closed triads in a positive way. This 
will lead to either complete networks or, if direct ties are relatively expensive, to 
networks that segment into different complete sub-networks (see Burger and Buskens 
2006). 
An important next question is how we can test our results. The settings to 
which Burt’s network entrepreneurship (and thus also our results) applies are 
competitive settings where non-redundant, first-hand information is important. We can 
imagine two examples of settings that fulfill these conditions to some extent. First, 
colleagues within firms in which the competition for promotion is very high (e.g., 
consider a firm as in Burt and Ronchi 2006 in which a large group of employees is 
trained in “structural-hole theory,” we would expect that performance is increasing 
due to more efficient information flows, but the effects on promotion changes can 
expected to be less striking (as is also found by Burt and Ronchi) given that structural 
advantages over others are probably less pronounced). A second application can be 
represented by firms in competitive and innovative sectors in which well-chosen 
alliances with other firms are an important precondition for securing competitiveness 
within the sector. Testing the theory does not need to concentrate only on testing 
whether the ultimate stable networks emerge. Looking at the micro-level, our model 
also provides predictions for which relations are more likely to be established or 
broken than others. Using longitudinal network data one could investigate the extent to 
which the model predicts changes in the network even when a stable network is not 
yet formed. This would imply that one tests whether the network constraint has an 
effect on tie formation using statistical models such as developed by Snijders (2001, 
2005). 
  To conclude, we want to emphasize that this article provides a benchmark for 
research on the emergence of networks. Using a combination of equilibrium and  
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simulation analysis we have shown how one can derive stable networks, study the 
likelihood of the emergence of these networks, and thus how one can derive 
hypotheses on the structures that can be expected given specified network benefits. 
The theoretical methodology allows for many possible extensions. A seemingly 
obvious one would be adding explicit costs for maintaining ties, as is common in the 
literature. This would be particularly interesting if we assumed heterogeneity between 
actors in costs of “bridging” ties. Some actors might be “natural” entrepreneurs, while 
others do not have the inclination or courage to step up to strangers and build bridging 
ties, or they just do not observe these brokerage opportunities. Another way to include 
heterogeneity among actors into the model might be to assume that structural holes are 
not the only things that matter. In many settings, other competing incentives will be 
present, such as balance in friendship networks. As Burt (2005, ch. 5) notes in the last 
chapter of his recent book, stability might emerge in networks even with many 
brokerage opportunities still open, since a considerable number of actors are not 
interested in brokerage or are not able to observe these structural holes. Finally, 
considering the two types of social capital that Burt (2005, ch. 3) distinguishes, it may 
be fruitful to use a utility function that is a hybrid of a brokerage-based utility function 
and a closure-based utility function. One could then make the relative importance of 
closure a parameter and study the consequences for network stability. Sato (1997) has 
already taken a first step in this direction. Results would change, because complete 
bipartite networks do not include any closed triads. Likely, actors who care little about 
structural holes but a lot about friendship and trust end up in networks full of 
redundant ties and unexploited brokerage opportunities. 
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Appendix 
Theorem 0. For the Burt constraint measure holds: ci ≤ 9/8 if di > 0 for all actors i in 
the network. 
 
Proof. Recall that we can rewrite the constraint measure as: 
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We rearrange the terms in this double summation realizing that for each 
neighbor j of i, the term 1/dj is included exactly once for each common neighbor k. In 
addition, the number of neighbors that j shares with i is smaller than or equal to dj – 1 
and smaller than or equal to di – 1. Therefore,  
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One maximizes a sum of squares of nonnegative numbers while holding the 
sum constant by assigning a value as close to 0 as possible to all elements but one and 
assigning the remainder to this last element. Since the sum of the di numbers is smaller  
  53
than or equal to 2di – 1 and d’s are always larger or equal to 1, the maximum sum of 
squares is  1 1 ) 1 ( 2 2 2 − + = ⋅ − + i i i i d d d d . Hence, we can write: 
 
4
5 1 1
1
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2
2 2
2 ≤
− +
≤ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+ = ∑∑
i
i i
jk k i
i
d
d d
d d
c  
For di = 2, we know that ci reaches a maximum when the two neighbors are 
connected: ci = 9/8 < 5/4. Since the previous formula tells us that for di > 6, ci is 
strictly lower than 9/8, inspecting all 7-actor networks and not finding a value for ci of 
at least 9/8 implies that 9/8 is indeed the maximum value for ci. The argument for this 
last implication is that every network position for a focal actor with 6 or fewer 
neighbors that can occur will occur in a 7-actor network. In larger networks, this can 
only be complemented with neighbors who have more neighbors themselves outside 
the original seven actors, but this will only decrease the constraint of the focal actor. 
This completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 1. Adding a tie without creating closed triads is always beneficial for both 
actors involved in the new tie.  
 
Proof. We rewrite the constraint of actor i as: 
∑∑
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+ ≡
jq q i
i d d
c
2
2
1
1
1  
where di is the number of actors i is linked to, j is the index for neighbors of i, and q is 
the index for neighbors of i that are also connected to j. This can be done because pij = 
1/di for all neighbors j of i. Suppose that two actors i and r can add a tie without 
creating a closed triad. Neither before nor after tie addition are there any actors q who  
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are connected to both i and r. Let ci denote the network constraint of i before and ci* 
after the initiation of the new tie, and let j continue to stand for the index of neighbors 
before tie addition. Then,  
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Using straightforward calculations, this implies that 
 
() ()
()
() ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+
− +
−
+
= ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ −
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ +
+
= −
jq q i i
i i
i jq q i jq q i
i i d d d
d d
d d d d d
c c
2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
* 1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
1
1  
()
()
() () ()
2 2
22 2
1 1 11
0.
1 111
iii
ii ii i i i
ddd
dd dd dd d
+− −−
≤− = = − <
+ +++
 
Thus, the addition of the new tie necessarily decreases actor i’s network 
constraint and hence increases his utility. Similarly, the constraint decreases for actor 
r. This completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 2. A complete bipartite network of size n is pairwise Nash, unless it is a k-
star with k > 3. 
 
Proof. We proceed by showing that no change to such a network is profitable and 
feasible. Removing one or more ties is not an option in a Kk,l because that would create 
a shortest path longer than 2, and hence it cannot be an improvement by corollary 1. 
Therefore, we need to consider only conditions under which group members create a 
tie within their group. Without loss of generality, assume k ≤ l. The constraint in the 
complete bipartite network equals 
k
1
 for actors in the group of size l and 
l
1
 for actors  
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in the group of size k. Creating a tie in the larger group of l actors changes the 
constraint of the two actors involved in that tie to  
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k k k
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,  
because these actors now have one common neighbor with all the actors in the group 
of size k and k common neighbors with each other. In order for the network to be 
pairwise Nash, this expression must be larger than 
k
1
, or  
 
()
()
()()
22 2
22 2 2 2 42
2 2
222 2
21
(2 ) (1 ) ( )(1 )
1
(1 ) ( )( 2 41 ) .
kk l k k
kl k kk k l k l
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kk k l k k l
⎡⎤ ++ +
+> ⇔ + + + + > + ⎢⎥
+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
⇔+ + > + +
   (3.2) 
Thus, if k = 1, 
22 4( 1) 7 4 ll l + >⇔ < should hold. Therefore, stars are stable 
only if there are fewer than 4 peripheral actors. If k > 1, then the inequality above is 
always implied by 
22 3 (1 )2 41 31 0 kk k k k k +> ++ ⇔−− > , and this condition is 
always fulfilled for k > 1. 
The same expression should hold for actors in the small group, but then with k 
and l reversed:  
()
()
()()
22 2
2 2
21
1
ll l k l
kl l
⎡⎤ ++ +
+> ⎢⎥
+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 (3.3) 
Inequality (3.3) is satisfied for any l > 1, l ≥ k ≥ 1, by reasons of symmetry, because 
(3.2) holds for all k > 1. Note that the case l = k = 1 is irrelevant because no tie can be 
added. This completes the proof. 
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Theorem 3. Complete bipartite networks are Pareto-efficient. 
 
Proof. Consider an actor i from the smaller group of k ≤ l actors. The network 
constraint of i can be lower in another network than in the focal complete bipartite 
network only if he has more than l ties in that other network. This is so because the 
minimal constraint one can have with l ties, namely in the absence of closed triads, is 
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l
l d d
c
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1 1 1
1
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⎣
⎡
+ ≡ ∑∑ . 
Let a ≤ k – 1 be this additional number of ties of actor i, let j be the index for 
neighbors of i in the new network, and q the index for actors that i and j share as 
neighbors, let πj indicate the proportion ties of j with other neighbors of i out of all ties 
of j, and  j π  the average of all l + a proportions j π . Then, for i to have a lower network 
constraint in the new network, the following inequality must hold: 
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The least obvious step in the derivation above is the first equality, which is 
implied by the fact that for each j the number of times 1/dj should be added due to 
closed triads is equal to number of common neighbors j has with i.  
Note that for each j, in order to be at least as well off in the new network as in 
the complete bipartite network considered, his degree dj must be at least k. Only k – a  
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– 1 of j’s connections can be to actors whom actor i is not connected to, thereby 
excluding i himself. For each j, πj may therefore be no less than a/k: 
 
j
j
j
dk aaa
dk l
−+
π≥ ≥ ≥  for all j. 
We have reached a contradiction. Thus, to lower i’s network constraint, at least 
one actor j must be given fewer than k neighbors, and this actor is consequently 
strictly worse off in the new network than in the complete bipartite network 
considered. 
A potential Pareto-improvement must therefore leave the network constraints 
of all actors with l ties unchanged, give them precisely l ties and no closed triads. 
However, this can be done only in the complete bipartite network considered, or in the 
case of k = l, in another complete bipartite network with two groups of size k. This 
renders the assumed Pareto-improvement impossible and completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 4. A complete bipartite network is unilaterally stable if and only if it is 
balanced. 
 
Proof. If. Consider an actor i from the group of k actors. We know from the proof of 
theorem 3 that we cannot make this actor better off without letting one of his 
neighbors have a degree lower than k. But leaving the ties that do not involve actor i 
unchanged, all his neighbors have at least degree k. Actor i can therefore not lower his 
constraint by only changing his own ties. In the even case, in which k = l, by 
symmetry, this impossibility of unilateral improvement extends to actors of the group 
of size l. The single remaining possibility for unilateral improvement is therefore a 
permitted decrement of the constraint of an actor i from the group of l actors in the odd  
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case, in which k = l – 1. Let 0 ≤ bk ≤ k be the number of ties actor i has with actors 
from the group of size k in the new network, and let 0 ≤ bl ≤ k be the number of ties he 
has with actors from the group of size l. Again, leave the ties that do not involve actor 
i unchanged. Because these ties constitute the balanced complete bipartite network 
with k = l − 1 actors in each group, the following inequality must hold: 
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The left-hand side of this last inequality is never strictly positive, and the right-
hand side is never strictly negative. Hence, it cannot be satisfied. 
Only if. If l – k > 1, an actor from the larger group of l actors can delete all his 
ties with actors from the smaller group of k actors and add l – 1 ties to the other actors 
from the larger group of l actors. By doing so, she decreases her constraint from 
k
1
 to 
1
1
− l
. By permitting this change, the l – 1 actors see their constraint fall from 
k
1
 to 
1
1
+ k
. This completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 5. All complete multipartite networks are pairwise stable if the groups are of 
equal size and contain more than one actor. 
 
Proof. Let n2 = n / m > 1 be the size of each group. Then for a complete m-partite 
network with equal groups of n2 size with constraint ci, the following inequality should 
hold such that no one wants to severe a tie to obtain a network with constraint ci*  
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(note that we need only one equation because all actors have automorphically 
equivalent positions).  
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which is always true because 
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For no actor to benefit from adding any of his equivalent potential ties in this 
complete n/n2-bipartite network with equal-sized groups, the following inequality 
must hold: 
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Since n2 < x = n – n2, the equation above is implied by (replacing  2
2
2 by    xn n ): 
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which holds because n2 ≥ 2 and x > 0. This completes the proof. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXCHANGE NETWORKS IN EQUILIBRIUM  
 
(with Vincent Buskens) 
 
Introduction 
How well people do in social or economic exchange depends heavily on how 
they are connected to potential exchange partners. This conclusion draws a branch of 
sociology that seeks to answer the question at what rate two trading parties exchange 
if they are embedded in a network of exchange relations (e.g., Willer 1999). 
  The conclusion is important. It makes relaxing the classical exchange 
assumption that every trader is connected to every other trader worth the cost of the 
theoretical complexity that it adds. However, this edge over classical exchange theory 
immediately dematerializes once the assumption is replaced by one of a different 
exchange network. Any fixed alternative network that sociological exchange scholars 
impose is as arbitrary as the complete network. 
  Our aim is to investigate what deals traders close in equilibrium when 
networks are variable. Instead of forcing exchange relations upon the profit-seeking 
actors, we allow them to choose trading partners freely. Costs of entertaining a trade 
relation may prevent them from forming the complete network. 
  We will vary these costs between 0 and maximum profit. We stay within the 
framework of sociological exchange networks. This will allow us to use the 
information it has acquired in laboratory research over the past thirty years for an 
informed guess on expected profit splits in incomplete networks. It will, on the other 
hand, limit us theoretically to the particular experimental exchange setting it considers. 
Let us take a look at this setting to clarify how limiting this framework precisely is. 
  Subjects are positioned behind a networked computer. Subjects occupy each  
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position in the network precisely once. The time they occupy a position is called a 
period. The number of periods thus equals the number of positions in the network 
under study. A period consists of several rounds. Each round ends either because no 
further exchanges are possible or because time is up. During a round, a subject can 
make offers to other subjects he is connected to in the network (‘neighbors’) as long as 
he has not closed a deal with a neighbor. A subject can also accept an offer from a 
neighbor, or confirm a neighbor’s acceptance of an offer he made himself. An offer is 
a proposed division of 24 profit points. Whenever an offer is accepted and confirmed, 
the two subjects exchange, that is, they receive the share of the profit they agreed 
upon. They are temporarily removed from the network and must wait till the next 
round to continue bargaining. Thus, each subject can close a deal with at most one 
neighbor in the network, which has been called the “one-exchange rule.” 
 
 
   Before C and D exchange                  After C and D exchange 
Figure 4.1. The 4-Line Network 
 
Consider a network called the 4-Line (see Figure 4.1). A node represents a 
position and an edge a relation in which exchange might take place. In the 4-Line, B 
and C can exchange with one another or with A resp. D, while A and D can only 
exchange with one actor, B and C resp. Table 1 shows an imaginary bargaining 
sequence for the 4-Line in the experimental setting outlined above. 
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Table 4.1. Imaginary Bargaining Sequence for the 4-Line 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the sequence, the network looks like the one left in Figure 
4.1. The first accepted and confirmed offer is the (10, 14) division proposed by D to C 
in the 17th second. After their exchange the only remaining potential exchange is one 
taking place between A and B. The network now looks like the one right in Figure 4.1,  
  71
and is essentially a dyad with two isolates. The exchange between A and B occurs at 
time 0:42 after a number of offers and counteroffers. The first bid in round 2 is a (14, 
10) division proposed by the C to D. 
  Let us point to two important differences between this exchange setting and 
typical exchange settings studied in economics. First, no actor can sell or buy multiple 
products or services. Second, buyers and sellers are not distinguished. Everyone can 
trade with everyone. An example would be a monogamous homosexual relationship 
market. Trade relations are potential relationships, only one of which can be realized 
at a time. The exchange rate then reflects the balance of power in the relationship. (For 
an application of exchange theory to intimate relationships, see Van de Rijt and Macy 
2006). 
  Our strategy will be to provide the actors with all information on how much 
they would earn from exchange if they added or deleted a tie. Then we let them 
maximize profit by adding and deleting ties and see what exchange network has 
emerged when the dust clears. The distribution of exchange benefits in this 
equilibrium network will be the answer to our research question. This strategy thus 
requires information on expected earnings and an equilibrium concept. 
  In order for the earnings information to be of decent quality and unambiguous, 
we need a method that translates the host of experimental findings on earnings into a 
single-valued estimate for every position in every network, and does so following a 
theoretically underpinned principle of exchange. We employ Sequential Power-
Dependence Theory (SPDT), developed by Buskens and Van de Rijt (2006), who 
adjust Cook and Yamagishi (1992)’s implementation of Emerson’s (1962) exchange 
principle of equidependence, show that the method is empirically competitive with 
other existing methods, and prove that its predictions satisfy uniqueness and existence. 
The equi-dependence principle corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash  
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1950) from cooperative bargaining theory when profit is equated with utility and 
expected earnings in alternative relationships are equated with disagreement points; 
Exchange occurs when the difference between proposed share and disagreement point 
for actor 1 equals that difference for actor 2. We review SPDT in the next section. 
  In order to determine equilibrium given these predicted earnings, we employ 
two equilibrium concepts: Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) and 
unilateral stability (Van de Rijt and Buskens 2007). Networks are stable if none of n 
actors can instantly gain from changing t ties without any of his new contacts 
incurring an instant loss. For pairwise stability, t = 1. For unilateral stability, t = n - 1. 
 
Specification of Exchange Rates 
Let X = (xij) be an n × n symmetric network, with xij = xji = 1 if actors i and j can 
exchange, 0 otherwise. Let N(X) = {{i, j}| xij = 1} be the set of ties in network X, 
where ties are two-element subsets of the set of all actors, and let N = |N(X)| be the 
cardinality of this set. X\{i, j} is the network X with the ith and jth column and row 
deleted, i.e., with i and j and all their relations removed from the network. 
  vi(X) is the value of network X to actor i, which is defined as i’s expected value 
across all his relations. If i is expected to earn all of the 24 points in every experiment, 
vi(X) = 1, while if he is expected to earn 12 points on average, vi(X) = ½.
1 Let pij be the 
probability that i and j are the first to exchange. Because only actors that have a link 
can exchange, pij = 0 if {i, j} ∉ N(X). As long as the network is not empty it is 
assumed that at each point in time exactly one tie exchanges, or ∑i∑j≠i = 1. 
) 1 /( ij kl
ij
kl p p p − =  denotes the conditional probability that k and l are the first to 
exchange if i and j are not. Define  0 =
ij
kl p  if pij = 1, which corresponds below with i 
and j dividing the profit pool equally if they have to exchange with each other. It 
                                                 
1 The rather arbitrary profit pool of 24 points is transformed here to a 0-1 scale via the value function.  
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follows that vi(X) = vj(X) = ½ if n = 2 and xij = xji = 1 (a dyad). Furthermore, vi(X) = 0 
for any actor i without any ties. Define
i
ij s  as the share an actor i obtains if he is 
involved in the first exchange with actor j. Because the profit pool is always 
distributed in its entirety, 
i
ij
j
ij s s − =1 . If i is not involved in the first exchange, but 
instead j and k are, then he receives what he can obtain in X\{j, k}. For the example of 
the 4-Line, in the situation after C and D have exchanged, right in Figure 4.1, the 4-
Line has been transformed into a dyad. A and B then earn ½ each. The value of a 
network to an actor i can thus be recursively defined as 
 
() { } ( ) ∑∑ ∑ ≠≠ ≠ ≠ + =
i jj k i k i jk i j
i
ij ij i k j X v p s p X v
, , \                     (4.1) 
where the values for pij are given. Now, suppose that for a certain network size n, we 
know each value vi for each actor i of each network of smaller size. Then, in order to 
be able to calculate the values of a network of size n for all actors in that network, 
what remains to be done is computing the sij. Consider the case that i and j exchange 
first. Now, the equidependence principle (Emerson 1962) is applied that each actor 
gets his alternative payoff plus half of the remainder of the profit pool (this remainder 
might be a negative amount). More precisely, i’s alternative payoff in an exchange 
with j is what i would have gotten if i and j would not have been the first to exchange. 
This is what i gets in the case of each of the other relations exchanging first, weighted 
by the corresponding probabilities of first exchange. In a formula, i’s expected payoffs 
if he does not start to exchange with j equals 
 
{ } ( ) ∑∑ ∑ ≠≠ ≠ +
j i kk i l i
ij
kl j i k
i
ik
ij
ik l k X v p s p
,, , , \                      (4.2) 
Here the first term indicates the alternatives payoffs if i exchanges with someone else 
in the first opportunity and the second term indicates what i expects to receive if he  
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does not exchange first. A similar formula holds for j and the equidependence 
principle then implies that the difference between the payoffs in a first exchange 
between i and j should be the same as the difference between their expected exchanges 
if they would not exchange with each other. Thus, 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ ≠ ≠ − + − = −
j i k
j
jk i
ij
jk j i k j
i
ik
ij
ik
j
ij
i
ij s k i X v p k i X v s p s s
, , , \ , \              (4.3) 
{} () { } ( ) [ ] ∑∑ ≠≠ − +
j i kk j i l j i
ij
kl l k X v l k X v p
,, , , \ , \ 
 
or 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ ≠ ≠ − + − + =
j i k
j
jk i
ij
jk j i k j
i
ik
ij
ik
i
ij s k i X v p k i X v s p s
, , , \ , \ 1 2              (4.4) 
{} () { } ( ) [ ] ∑∑ ≠≠ − +
j i kk j i l j i
ij
kl l k X v l k X v p
,, , , \ , \ 
 
The right-hand side of equation (4.4) consists of three parts. The first part indicates 
how much i and j would obtain if i and someone else than j were the first to exchange. 
The second part indicates what i and j would obtain if j and someone else than i were 
the first to exchange. And the third part indicates what i and j would obtain if two 
other actors exchanged first. So the difference in the profit between i and j when they 
exchange first is assumed equal to the difference between what i and j earn when they 
do not exchange first. The small rearrangement in equation (4.4) uses the fact that the 
proportions the two actors obtain sum to 1. A similar equation holds for every 
exchange relation {i, j} in the network X. These N equations include N unknown 
variables 
i
ij s  when the outcomes of exchanges for smaller networks are already 
known. The corresponding system of linear equations As = c has A as N x N matrix of  
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coefficients and c as vector of constants. Buskens and Van de Rijt (2006) show that 
for parameters pij and given network values in smaller networks vi(X\{i, j}), the system 
As = c always has a unique solution, and this solution satisfies 0 ≤ 
i
ij s ≤ 1 for all {i, j} 
in N(X). 
  As an example we will take a look at the so-called ‘Box-Stem’ (see Figure 
4.2). This network contains six actors, A through F, and six ties: N(X) = {{A, B}, {A, 
C}, {B, D}, {C, D}, {D, E}, {E, F}}. Assume we have already calculated the values 
of networks with 4 actors. If A and B exchange first they obtain sAB and 1 − sAB. Then 
we would have a 4-Line (see Figure 4.1) left, in which actors C through F earn 7/16, 
9/16, 9/16, and 7/16, in that order. These are the six entries in the first row of Table 2. 
We repeat this procedure for all other rows in a similar manner. This leads to the 
following list of exchange possibilities. 
 
Table 4.2. Profit Matrix for the Box-Stem 
 
 
Now we derive the six equidependence equations. We assume for this example 
that all relations are equally likely to be the first to be used (the existence and  
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uniqueness of the solution do not depend on that assumption). For the exchange 
between A and B should hold (subtracting the payoffs for A and B in rows 2 through 6 
above) 
 
2sAB = 1 + 1/5((sAC − 7/16) + (½ − sBD) + (½ − ½) + (0 − 1) + (½ − ½))              (4.5) 
 
or 
 
2sAB − 1/5sAC + 1/5sBD = 13/16                       (4.6) 
 
Similarly, the other five equations can be derived. Then the solution to this system of 
six linear equations in six unknowns can be calculated: sAB = 0.65, sAC = 0.65, sBD = 
0.39, sCD = 0.39, sDE = 0.51, and sEF = 0.60. These values eliminate all unknowns from 
Table 2, so that the weighted column averages are now the expected profit shares of 
the six actors. Since it was assumed that all dyads are equally likely to be first, all the 
weights (pij) are equal to 1/6. For actor A we have 
 
vA = 1/6(0.65 + 0.65 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 1 + 0.5) = 0.63                   (4.7) 
 
Similarly, we obtain vB = 0.34, vC = 0.34, vD = 0.55, vE = 0.53, and vF = 0.33 for the 
other actors. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The Box-Stem Network 
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Analysis Strategy 
We are interested in the networks that are pairwise or unilaterally stable if 
actors expect SPDT earnings in their exchange relations and pay a maintenance cost 
for each relation they entertain. We vary this maintenance cost between 0 and ½. 
Values above ½ are uninteresting because dyadic costs then outweigh dyadic benefits, 
so that only the empty network can be stable. Due to computational constraints, we 
limit analysis to all small networks, with between 2 and 8 actors. 
  Let us review the two equilibrium concepts in more detail. We identify those 
networks in which no actor wants to delete a tie and no pair of actors wants to add a 
tie. Such networks are referred to as pairwise stable (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). An 
actor wants to delete a tie if he receives a larger profit in the network without it. This 
may depend on how costly it is to maintain such a tie. A pair of actors wants to add a 
tie if at least one of the actors is strictly better of adding this tie and the other actor is 
not worse off by adding this tie. E.g., in the so-called 3-Line (A connected to B and B 
connected to C) with no cost for maintaining ties, a dyad and an isolate is not stable, 
because one actor in the dyad would be better off by connecting to the isolate. And the 
isolate would not object because he earns zero in either network. As soon as there is 
some cost 0 < c ≤ ½ for maintaining ties, the isolate vetoes a proposed connection. He 
would be paying maintenance cost for a tie that brings no profit. 
  In addition, we check which of the pairwise stable networks also fulfill the 
stronger equilibrium concept unilateral stability (equivalent to initiative-proof Nash in 
the related Myerson game, see Van de Rijt and Buskens, 2007). The stronger stability 
concept considers a network stable only if no actor can propose a new configuration of 
his own ties to which none of his new contacts object. If some actor can delete some 
ties and add some ties to other actors that agree to add those ties, i.e. they are at least 
as well off in the new network as in the original one, then a network is not stable. E.g.,  
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consider a triangle (closed triad) and an isolate. As we will see below this network is 
pairwise stable in some cost range. However, this network will never be unilaterally 
stable, because an actor in the triangle can propose to remove the two links to the other 
actors in the triangle and add a link to the isolate. The isolate will not object to this 
proposal. Although they have no ‘veto right’, also the two other actors will profit from 
this  hange. They lose one tie and gain profit. If we use the term ‘stable’ below without 
the qualification pairwise or unilateral, we mean that both stability concepts apply. 
Which networks are pairwise stable for a given cost range is determined as follows. 
The upper bound of the cost range in which the network is stable is the minimum loss 
for an actor over all possible tie deletions. The lower bound is the maximum gain of 
the least interested actor across all tie additions. Clearly if the interval is empty, i.e. the 
upper bound is lower than the lower bound, the network is unstable for all possible 
costs. Given the fact that for pairwise stability we always consider either only tie 
deletion or only tie addition, the range of values for which a network is pairwise stable 
is always one connected interval (possibly empty). On the contrary, unilateral stability 
considers tie addition and tie removal simultaneously, which implies that every 
unilateral deviation from a network has its own lower bound and upper bound for 
which the actors want such change. This can also lead to a stability cost range that 
consists of multiple disconnected intervals. We identified the only two such cases for 
small networks. 
 
Stability Results 
Our first result is that few networks are stable. Of all 13,597 networks with 2 − 
8 actors, only 210 are stable. Moreover, most of the networks that are stable under 
only one of the two stability concepts are stable for a small cost range. If we consider 
pairwise stable networks that are stable in a cost range of at least 1/12 (or two points in  
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the experimental setting), only 59 stable networks remain. We will focus on this 
particular subset, to make all results fit in a 1-page table. Networks with a broader cost 
range can be considered more stable; A random utility component exceeding 1/12 
would destabilize any of the omitted networks. Complete data on the stability ranges 
under SEDT and EVT are available from the authors. 8 of the 59 stable networks are 
empty, which are pairwise stable as well as unilaterally stable for any tie cost larger or 
equal to ½. Table 3 displays all 51 non-empty networks that for costs in an interval of 
at least 1/12, or 2 profit points in the experiment, are pairwise stable. For these 
networks, it lists the name, the lower diagonal of the adjacency matrix of the network, 
the lower and upper bound of the cost interval within which it is pairwise stable, and 
the lower and upper bound of the cost interval within which it is unilaterally stable. 34 
of these pairwise stable networks are also unilaterally stable within some cost interval. 
  Second, the efficiency of stable networks is positively related to the size of the 
interval within which they are stable. The complete network, the most inefficient 
network for costs between 0 and 1/2, is never stable for costs greater than some critical 
value, but always stable if costs are 0. For any size, a network consisting of dyads with 
at most one isolate, the most efficient network for costs between 0 and 1/2, is stable if 
costs are 0.042 or higher. This is because the addition of a tie with an isolate creates a 
3-Line in which the isolate again earns zero, and the addition of a tie between two 
dyads creates a 4-Line in which the middle actors earn only marginally more than in 
two dyads. The positive relationship between efficiency and stability is also reflected 
in the negative relationship between density and tie cost. 
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Table 4.3. Stable Networks 
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  Our third result is that all stable networks are egalitarian: Profit is split equally. 
In the literature on exchange networks, these networks are called ‘equal-power’. This 
equality can be traced back to the symmetric structure of the networks; Actors within 
components have automorphically equivalent positions. Any profit prediction method 
that gives automorphically equivalent actors the same profit will make such networks 
equal-power. SPDT does so because such actors are obviously equi-dependent. 
  It is instructive to look at some networks to get an idea why automorphism is 
so common-place in stable networks. Recall that the cost range within which a 
pairwise network is stable has as lower bound the maximum gain of the least 
interested actor across all tie additions and as upper bound the minimum loss for an 
actor over all possible tie deletions. For the ‘cycle’ networks and the dyads—both 
symmetric—it is clear that the loss of any tie decreases the benefits of the networks for 
each of the actors in the network quite dramatically. This implies that the upper bound 
is pretty high. The gains that can be made in these networks by adding a tie on the 
other hand are rather low. This leaves a considerable range of tie costs for which these 
networks are stable. The full networks—another class of symmetric networks—are 
stable because there the lower bound of the interval does not exist (or equals minus 
infinity) because no one can add a tie. Therefore, these networks are pairwise stable as 
long as the gain from adding the last tie in the network outweighs its cost. 
  One reason for why many asymmetric networks are unstable for most or all 
costs of ties is that the profits for actors who add a tie to a symmetric network are 
mostly smaller than the externalities they create for the other actors. Consider the 
square. If two actors add a tie we obtain the D-Box. Because the new tie creates the 
possibility for inefficient exchange patterns, namely the two actors with the new tie 
exchange, the expected total profit of the new network is smaller than in the square. 
This implies that there has to be a net loss and that if tie cost is low enough to add this  
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tie in the D-Box, these cost are certainly low enough for the other two actors to add 
the last tie and make the symmetric full square in which everything is even again and 
the expected total profit is also optimal again. Similarly, if ties become too costly to 
cover the advantage of being in the square rather than being one of the peripheral 
actors in the 4-Line, the square will disintegrate. Following a similar argument, if the 
4-Line is better than the square for the peripheral actors, then being in a dyad is 
certainly better for the middle actors in the 4-Line than being in the 4-Line. This is 
why asymmetric networks like the D-Box and the 4-Line are not stable. These 
arguments become more complex in the larger networks we considered. Non-
automorphically equivalent actors might coexist in larger stable networks, but these 
networks are stable only for small cost ranges. We do not know to what extent these 
conclusions generalize for large networks. 
  Also in the disconnected stable structures, components contain positions that 
are all automorphically equivalent. Stability of such structures involves two 
conditions. First, each subnetwork should be stable itself, thus the stability range can 
be at most the intersection of the stability ranges of the components. Second, the 
actors in the two components should not have an incentive to add a tie between them. 
Because of the automorphic equivalence, only one tie needs to be considered between 
each pair of subnetworks for understanding stability. For two components with an 
even or two components with an odd number of actors, the arguments are similar as 
above. With separate components everybody is obtaining a similar proportion of the 
resource pool. Adding a tie mostly hurts the not involved actors more than it helps the 
involved actors. This implies that whenever ties are cheap enough to provide an 
incentive to connect subnetworks, other actors will tend to subsequently also have 
incentives to try to get back to a more symmetric structure. If costs on the other hand 
are just high enough for the connection to be no longer profitable, actors also do not  
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have an incentive to remove ties. A two-component network, one with an even number 
of actors and one with an odd number of actors, is sometimes even stable for zero tie 
cost, because the actor in the odd component does not want to connect at all with the 
other component. The reason is that the addition of this tie is so much more 
advantageous for the connecting actor in the component with an even number of actors 
that the expected outcome for the connecting actor in the odd-sized component is 
decreased as a result of this new connection with a relatively high power actor. These 
networks are not unilaterally stable for zero cost because (at least in the networks of 
small n that we consider here) one actor of the even-sized component wants to connect 
with all actors in the odd-sized component making himself and the actors in the odd-
sized component better off. 
 
Equilibrium Selection 
We have identified stable networks for all costs. For many costs, multiple 
equilibria exist. This raises the question which equilibrium is more likely. We 
conclude by providing a partial answer to that question. 
  We start from a given network structure and give actors the opportunity to add 
and delete ties. We are interested in what network will ultimately evolve. We choose a 
setup in which an actor is randomly chosen. This actor is allowed to change one tie. 
We assume that the actor maximizes utility across all tie changes that can count on 
approval or don’t need approval. He does not propose a tie that makes the relevant 
other worse off. Thus, one could say that these actors are myopically rational actors 
and think all other actors are as well; They choose the best option possible, but 
disregard subsequent changes by other actors, and expect other actors to do so as well 
in their evaluations of tie proposals. We continue to choose random actors until no 
more actor wants to remove a tie or can add a beneficial tie with consent of the other  
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actor in this tie. If this process ends, it ends in a pairwise stable network. We run the 
process starting from all 13,597 possible different network structures with 2 to 8 
actors. All runs converged to a pairwise stable network. The simulation was 
completely deterministic except for the order of actors that could change a tie. To 
estimate the likelihood of convergence to a certain network we weighted the outcomes 
proportionally to the number of isomorphisms of the starting network. We used eight 
different values of tie costs: 0, 1/24, 1/12, 1/8, 1/6, 5/24, 1/4, 7/24, and 1/3. For tie 
costs higher than 1/3, a network consisting of dyads and possibly an isolate is the only 
stable network given the size of the network. 
  If tie costs are 0, pairwise stable networks other than the complete network 
exist only for network sizes 5 and 7. These incomplete networks hardly ever evolve. 
The full network loses its dominance if cost becomes higher, but the precise moment 
depends on the size of the network. The full network already loses its dominance at tie 
costs 1/24 for sizes 3, 4, and 8. For sizes 6 and 7 this is 1/12, and 1/8 for size 5. For 
certain intermediate cost ranges, no networks are very dominant. At a certain cost 
level (for most sizes around 1/8), cycles (pentagon, hexagon etc.) or combinations of 
cycles, e.g., squares and triads, become the most dominant networks. As can be 
expected, the density of the emerging networks is strongly negatively related to tie 
cost. The correlation between tie cost and density of the emerging networks is about -
0.84. For network sizes 2 through 8, at and beyond tie cost 5/24, the (efficient) 
networks with dyads and possibly one isolate are the most dominant networks. 
 
Discussion 
We have sought an answer to the question how exchange parties trade in 
equilibrium when the available trade relations are not fixed as in classical exchange 
theory but variable. We proceeded by having profit-seeking actors add and delete  
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costly ties after giving them the information on earnings increases and decreases from 
such changes to the network. This information came from a profit prediction method, 
SPDT, that (1) was backed up by extensive experimental investigations on how actors 
in small networks exchange, (2) provided unique predictions on who earns how much 
in any relation in any network, (3) was grounded in theoretical work on exchange. We 
employed stability concepts from the recently emerged literature on dynamic networks 
to determine equilibrium. We found that very few networks are stable, that in these 
stable networks actors always split the profit pool equally, and that they often do not 
trade efficiently. This inefficiency comes from the fact that too many costly exchange 
relations are entertained. The traders would all make more net profit in a network with 
fewer exchange relations. The equality result could be traced back to automorphic 
equivalence between trading parties in stable networks. Emerson’s principle of equi-
dependence, on which the SPDT method is based, assigns equal profits to 
automorphically equivalent parties. One related study of exchange network evolution 
has been carried out that draws a similar conclusion with respect to exchange 
outcomes in changing networks. Bonacich (2001) has actors move on a checkerboard 
rather than add and delete ties, and has them satisfice rather than maximize, but also 
finds that in equilibrium payoff differentials are small. The current study is limited in 
at least three important ways. First, we have given actors an incredible amount of 
information, or, equivalently, an incredible ability to compute the marginal earnings 
impact from tie changes. It is unclear how the results change when, instead, actors 
apply simple heuristic rules and make mistakes. Second, we have only analyzed the 
stability for very small groups of traders. No group size-independent analytical results 
were established. Perhaps a simpler prediction method would allow for such results. 
Third, the results are scope-limited to setting in which buyers and suppliers are not 
distinguished and no trader can engage in more than one transaction. The results  
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nevertheless suggest that for inequality to arise in the terms of exchange, traders must 
also be unequal in their ability to change the network structure. They must be 
monopolists keeping entrants out by temporarily undercutting prices, lobbyists for 
protectionist policies, or possessors of superior naval technology allowing them to 
broker and capture the gains from trade between geographically disconnected 
parties. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE MATTHEW EFFECT IN IMMIGRANT 
ASSIMILATION 
 
Introduction 
In the research cycle, a simple model persists until a slightly more complicated 
model that makes theoretical sense empirically outperforms it. For a social process, 
the simplest model one can try to fit is one with a constant rate. On a chart with as 
horizontal axis time and as vertical axis the focal social phenomenon, this model 
produces a straight line. It has been repeatedly claimed that the conceptualization of 
the immigrant adjustment process as a straight line is flawed: ““Straight-line” 
theory…is much less successful in accounting for the experience of non-European 
origin groups.” (Waldinger & Gilbertson 1994:432; quotes in original) “These 
anomalies immediately question the applicability of straight-line assimilation.” (Zhou 
1997:72) “One cannot but…see that the process of “becoming American” has been far 
from a uniform or straight-line march” (Rumbaut 1997:488; quotes in original) 
The straight-line model is commonly attributed to classical scholarship on 
assimilation, sometimes called “the canonical account” (e.g., Nee & Alba 1997:827). 
A collection of early sociological works are said to share a common view of 
assimilation, namely that of a monotonic process during which the immigrant or 
immigrant group, as life- or calendar time progresses or subsequent generations 
replace preceding ones, further and further adjusts towards greater and greater 
assimilation. The debate does not revolve around the quantitative feature of linearity. 
It can be a “bumpy line” (Gans 1992:44). Some even contend that “…none of the 
scholars whose names are associated with assimilation theory (e.g., Park, Frazier, 
Myrdal, Gordon) posited that the path of ethnic change was linear...” (Hirschman  
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1991:180) And, without a quantifiable definition of assimilation, the linearity feature 
of the straight-line model is not even falsifiable. Contested, rather, is the qualitative 
model property of an irreversible course with only one possible end point, complete 
assimilation. It is this property against which much evidence has been presented, taken 
as null hypothesis in a multitude of empirical studies. 
These studies, of which I mention a few, show that in some ‘domain’ of 
assimilation and during some period or over the course of some generations, certain 
immigrants do not assimilate or even ‘reverse’ assimilate (Portes & Stepick 1993:8). 
In their classic study of New York City neighborhoods, Glazer & Moynihan (1963) 
describe how the Italians, Irish, Jews, and Puerto Ricans do not melt. More recently, 
Alba et al. (1999) show that length of stay is not related and U.S. citizenship inversely 
related to immigrants’ odds of suburbanization (p. 457), which Park & Burgess (1924) 
identified “…as a key step in a process of spatial, or residential, assimilation” (p. 447). 
Portes, Haller & Guarnizo (2002) find that “long periods of residence in the United 
States increase the probability of engaging in…transnational entrepreneurship…” 
which is “…contrary to what may be expected from an assimilationist perspective” (p. 
289). Guarnizo, Portes & Haller (2003) find no significant effect of U.S. citizenship 
and a positive effect of length of stay on engagement in political activities that involve 
the sending nation (p. 1234), which is at odds with “…orthodox theoretical 
approaches…” which predict “…that the longer immigrants live and are socialized 
into the ways of the host society, the greater the likelihood of their becoming 
thoroughly absorbed in it.” (p. 1215) Perreira et al. (2006) state that “The straight-line 
hypothesis predicts that ethnic differences in high school dropout rates, within and 
across immigrant generations, will diminish over time” (p. 512) but find that “…for 
every race-ethnicity except Hispanic, the first generation drops out at significantly 
lower rates than third and higher generations.” (p. 522) The question that these studies  
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thus raise is ‘If not a straight line, then what model does describe assimilation?’ 
In response to the counter-evidence, theorists have first removed the inevitability from 
the argument. In what has been called ‘segmented assimilation theory’, Portes & Zhou 
(1993) consider straight-line assimilation one out of a number of possible trajectories 
that immigrants may follow. In their ‘new assimilation theory’, Alba & Nee (2003) 
conclude that “…the assumption of inevitability assumes away what requires 
explanation...” (p. 38) and instead regard assimilation as “…something that frequently 
enough happens to people when they make other plans.” (p. 282) 
They have then proceeded to take two more important steps in the direction of 
an alternative model. Scholars have identified qualitative system behaviors, or “modes 
of assimilation” (Portes & Zhou 1993), that are commonly observed but that the old 
model cannot exhibit. Examples are long-term states of segregation in “immigrant 
enclaves” (Wilson & Portes 1980:295), forms of reverse assimilation such as “reactive 
ethnicity” (Portes & Rumbaut 2001:186) and “downward assimilation” (Portes & 
Rumbaut 2001:59), and forms of “selective assimilation” (Portes & Zhou 1993:90) 
such as assimilation without loss of ethnic identity or gain in economic status. 
They have also identified a host of mechanisms that appear to drive the 
assimilation dynamic. Alba & Nee (2003:38-57) organize “mechanisms of 
assimilation” into four categories, namely “purposive action”, “network mechanisms”, 
“forms of capital”, and “institutional mechanisms”. I will follow up on their effort and 
bring together from dispersed sources a range of mechanisms of assimilation of the 
first three categories. 
I attempt to take one further step. I propose an alternative model of 
assimilation that (1) incorporates these mechanisms of assimilation, (2) can exhibit the 
aforementioned modes of assimilation, (3) adds minimal complexity to the straight-
line model, and (4) is empirically competitive with the straight-line model. This  
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alternative model, as I then show, has the following characteristic qualitative property, 
namely that the quite-assimilated assimilate further while the not-so-assimilated 
reverse-assimilate, a property that, in the context of academic prestige was dubbed 
Matthew Effect (Merton 1968:57). 
I will proceed as follows. I define terms, overview mechanisms of assimilation, 
show how the hypotheses associated with the mechanisms are of a common, shared 
form, synthesize the hypotheses into a model, derive the existence of a Matthew 
Effect, show that the model allows for the various modes of assimilation, outline the 
testing strategy, test the various hypotheses and the Matthew Effect using panel data, 
and discuss limitations and some implications for contemporary debates and 
perspectives on assimilation. 
 
Definitions 
When an individual migrant or ethnic group arrives in a host country, it is 
potentially ethnically distinguishable in a number of ways. With time, these 
distinctions can remain, fade, or intensify. I borrow the definition of assimilation from 
Alba & Nee (2003), namely “the attenuation of distinction based on ethnic origin” (pp. 
30-1). Each way in which either an ethnic group or an individual can be distinct I will 
call a domain. Let aik denote the level of assimilation of individual i = 1, 2, …I in 
domain k = 1, 2, …K. aik → -∝ indicates minimal assimilation or maximal distinction, 
and aik → ∝ indicates maximal assimilation or minimal distinction. I consider eight 
domains (K = 8): marriage, language, residence, workplace, career, friendship, culture, 
and identity. 
Table 5.1. Domains of Assimilation 
Domain  Ethnic group  Individual migrant  Operationalization 
Household  Homogamy  Ethnicity of household  Proportion household members who speak English/French 
Language  Monolingualism  Fluency in official language  English/French language skills 
Residence  Residential segregation  Ethnicity of neighbors   Proportion neighbors from another country of origin 
Workplace  Workplace segregation  Ethnicity of colleagues  Proportion cross-ethnic colleagues 
Career  Income Disadvantage  Income Disadvantage  Log annual individual income from all sources 
Friendship  Homophily  Ethnicity of friends  Proportion cross-ethnic friends 
Culture  Ethnic traditions are practiced  Practices ethnic traditions  Does not find important to carry on ethnic traditions 
Identity  Ethnic identity  Identification with ethnic group  Does not feel close to ethnic group 
Table 5.2. Hypotheses by Source and Target Domains 
Domain Household  Language  Residence  Workplace Career Friendship  Culture  Identity 
Household   exposure  interaction  interaction 
& referral 
& trust 
 interaction  influence identification
Language facilitation    facilitation  facilitation skill  facilitation    
Residence interaction  exposure   interaction 
& referral 
& trust 
job 
prospects
interaction influence identification
Workplace interaction exposure  interaction    job 
prospects
interaction influence identification
Career     affordability          
Friendship interaction exposure interaction  interaction 
& referral 
& trust 
   influence identification
Culture selection    selection selection    selection     
Identity inclusion    inclusion inclusion    inclusion     
 
Note: Rows are source domains and columns are target domains.
9
2 
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Table 1 overviews the eight domains for two levels of analysis, the level of the 
individual migrant and the level of the ethnic group. A member of an ethnic group 
distinguishes herself in the household domain by sharing a household with members 
of her own ethnic group. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the marriage domain 
when strong homogamy makes many households mono-ethnic. A member of an ethnic 
group distinguishes herself in the language domain by speaking the official language 
of the host country poorly. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the language domain 
when it exhibits strong monolingualism. A member of an ethnic group distinguishes 
herself in the residence domain by having co-ethnic neighbors only. An ethnic group 
distinguishes itself in the residence domain when its members live segregated. A 
member of an ethnic group distinguishes herself in the workplace domain if all her 
colleagues co-ethnic. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the workplace domain 
when there are high levels of workplace segregation. A member of an ethnic group 
distinguishes herself in the career domain when she earns less. An ethnic group 
distinguishes itself in the career domain when its members earn less than the mean 
income. A member of an ethnic group distinguishes herself in the friendship domain if 
all her friends are co-ethnic. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the friendship 
domain if it exhibits strong homophily. A member of an ethnic group distinguishes 
herself in the culture domain if she carries on the traditions associated with her ethnic 
group. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the culture domain if its traditions are 
practiced. A member of an ethnic group distinguishes herself in the identity domain if 
she identifies with the ethnic group. An ethnic group distinguishes itself in the identity 
domain if it exhibits a strong ethnic identity. 
  A member of an ethnic group has lost her distinction entirely when she does 
not share her household with members of her own ethnic group, when she speaks the 
official language fluently, when her neighbors, colleagues, and friends are all of a  
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different ethnicity, when she earns a top-income, when she does not uphold the 
cultural values of her group, and when she does not identify with her ethnic group. An 
ethnic group has lost its distinction entirely when its members have as spouses, 
friends, colleagues, and neighbors members from other groups, when they speak the 
official language fluently, when they all earn top incomes, when they do not uphold 
the cultural values of the group, and when they do not identify with the ethnic group. 
One could argue that minimal distinction should occur instead when scores on 
domains correspond to those of an average member of society, not when they reach 
one of the extremes. For example, those with top incomes would then be less 
assimilated then those with nationally average incomes, and Chinese with no Chinese 
friends less than Chinese with one Chinese friend. Lacking those empirical averages 
for most domains and opting for simplicity, I place the point of minimal distinction at 
the extreme. 
  The domains are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but do reflect 
existing categorizations. The domains household, friendship, residence, and workplace 
match the first four categories of Bogardus’ social distance scale, namely people’s 
willingness to accept out-group members as close relative by marriage, close personal 
friend, neighbors on the same street, and co-workers in the same occupation (e.g. 
Babbie 1992). Assimilation along the domains residence, workplace, and friendship 
are perhaps what Gordon (1964:79) referred to as “structural assimilation,” 
assimilation along the culture domain “acculturation”, assimilation along the identity 
domain “ethnic identification”, assimilation along the household domain 
“intermarriage”, assimilation along the language domain “language acquisition”, and 
assimilation along the career domain what Chiswick (1978) referred to as “economic 
assimilation”. Note however, that while Gordon took as reference and end point of 
assimilation the time-specific and arguably arbitrary “middle-class cultural patterns of,  
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largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins,” (p. 72) the reference here is simply 
the out-group. Thus, in principle, everyone is considered an immigrant, and members 
of all classes, religions, and ethnicities can be dissimilated. The out-group as reference 
is implied by the Alba & Nee definition: If one looks like members of other ethnic 
groups, distinction is lost. Note also that Gordon considered the domains to be 
sequential stages in the assimilation process, whereas I allow the assimilation process 
to involve simultaneous changes, forward or backward, in multiple domains. 
I will express all model dynamics in terms of one conception of time, lifetime. 
Let t denote lifetime and  t a a ik ik ∂ ∂ = / &  the rate of assimilation for i in domain k. The 
straight-line hypothesis has also been cashed out in terms of calendar time as well as 
in terms of generations. We can analyze calendar time dynamics by considering 
individual-specific time zeros, and we can analyze generational dynamics by ensuring 
that the time zeros of members of later generations come after the time zeros of 
members of earlier generations. 
 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses I bring together from the immigration literature will all be of the 
following form: For any individual i, the rate of assimilation  ik a & in some target 
domain k positively depends on the level of assimilation ail in some source domain 
l≠k. Table 2 lists all hypotheses and gives the corresponding target domain, source 
domain, and social mechanism. 
Van Tubergen & Kalmijn (2005) discuss a strand of research that hypothesizes 
that exposure to the official language of the host country eases an immigrant’s 
acquisition of this language. The more frequent the contact with those who do not 
speak the ethnic language, the faster conversation skills improve. The ‘exposure 
hypothesis’ indeed fits the specified form when the target domain is language and the  
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source domain marriage, residence, workplace, or friendship. 
  The converse of the exposure hypothesis has also been stated (Chiswick & 
Miller 1995; Espinosa & Massey 1997). Language skills allow conversations one 
could otherwise not have and thus facilitate cross-ethnic contact. The ‘facilitation 
hypothesis’ has as target domain marriage, residence, workplace, or friendship, and as 
source domain language. 
  Alba & Logan (1993) hypothesize that “…members of minority 
groups...convert socio-economic and assimilation progress into residential gain.” (p. 
1390) The desire to live in a mixed neighborhood is often not sufficient. Because of 
housing price differences between ethnic and mixed neighborhoods, it must be 
complemented with the socio-economic means. The hypothesis stems from theoretical 
work on residential segregation by Massey (1985), and has come to be labeled the 
‘spatial assimilation hypothesis.’ Here I label each hypothesis by the associated social 
mechanism, hence ‘affordability hypothesis’. It can be made to fit the specified form 
by making residence the target domain and career the source domain. 
  Sanders, Nee, and Sernau (2002) argue that immigrants’ “...reliance on social 
ties...facilitates job hunting in the wider domain of the economy, where prospective 
employers may be of any ethnicity.” (p. 281) Conversely, “...ethnic networks provide 
sources of information about...sources of jobs inside the community.” (Portes & 
Rumbaut 1996:86) By definition, those who work in the ‘ethnic economy’ (Light & 
Karageorgis 1994) tend to be co-ethnic and those who work in the mixed economy of 
a different ethnicity. Information about jobs in the ethnic economy thus flows in 
through co-ethnic social ties and information about jobs in the mixed economy 
through cross-ethnic social ties. The ‘referral hypothesis’ (Nee, Sanders, and Sernau 
1994; Sanders et al. 2002) fits the proposed form when the target domain is workplace 
and the source domain is marriage, residence, or friendship.  
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Portes and colleagues (e.g., Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993) show how trust in 
ethnic ties allows fellow members of an ethnic group to provide startup funds for a 
business in the ethnic economy in the absence of a contract or formal guarantee. The 
‘trust hypothesis’ is based on this alternative mechanism through which assimilation in 
the workplace domain is contingent upon assimilation in the marriage, residential, and 
friendship domains. 
The monetary gains from trust in ethnic ties suggests another target domain, 
namely ‘career’, with an associated negative cross-domain effect, but this effect has in 
the past been subject to much debate (e.g., the back-and-forth in December 1987 issue 
of ASR). Sanders and Nee (1987) take elements from classical theories of assimilation 
and segmented labor market theory to counter-formulate what they call the “ecological 
hypothesis” (p. 745) that there is a mobility cost to economic and residential 
segregation. Advanced capitalist societies are structured such that jobs in ethnic firms 
located in ethnic neighborhoods tend to be in the secondary labor market thereby 
lacking opportunities for promotion and advancement. The ecological hypothesis thus 
has as source domains residence and workplace and as target domain career and 
operates through a “job prospects” mechanism. Whether or not the ecological 
hypothesis counteracts the trust hypothesis that concerns the career domain 
sufficiently to make the cross-domain effects positive is an empirical question. 
  Kalmijn and Flap (2001) speak of a “supply-side perspective” as a collection 
of theories that argue “that the social contexts in which people participate, mold their 
networks by shaping the pool from which they draw their contacts…” (p. 1290) The 
argument goes that people who share common characteristics tend to run into one 
another more readily, namely at meeting places that are associated with those 
characteristics (Blau & Schwartz 1984). Marriage, friends, the neighborhood, and the 
workplace are all typical meeting places. One’s spouse and one’s friends introduce one  
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to third parties who are all potential future friends, romantic partners, neighbors, or 
colleagues. Similarly, one meets romantic partners, friends, neighbors, and colleagues 
in the neighborhood and at work. The extent to which these meeting places are 
populated by co-ethnics determines how likely future spouses, friends, colleagues, and 
neighbors are co-ethnic. The ‘interaction’ hypothesis thus has as target and source 
domains marriage, residence, workplace, and friendship. 
  According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), people form an 
identity by classifying themselves as member or non-member of groups. They are 
more likely to identify with groups whose other members they interact with. The 
‘identification hypothesis’ thus has as target domain identity and as source domain 
marriage, residence, workplace, and friendship. 
One consequence of this identification is the inclusion of members in and 
exclusion of non-members from one’s social network. For the case of ‘residence’, this 
hypothesis can be found in the immigration literature as the ‘place stratification 
hypothesis’, which traces residential segregation back to exclusion on the basis of 
group membership (Denton & Massey 1989; Logan & Alba 1993). This ‘inclusion’ 
hypothesis has as target domains marriage, residence, workplace, and friendship, and 
as source domain ‘identity’. 
Two mechanisms underlie the pervasive tendency for people to interact with 
similar others: ‘selection’ and ‘influence’ (e.g., Macy et al. 2002). Selection is the 
choice of interaction partners on the basis of similarity. When cultural similarity is 
considered, the selection hypothesis has as target domains marriage, residence, 
workplace, and friendship, and as source domain ‘culture.’ For the case of ‘residence’, 
the selection mechanism is found in literature on the link between residential 
preferences and segregation (e.g., Schelling 1971). Influence concerns the opposite 
causality and is the tendency of people to grow similar to interaction partners. When  
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cultural similarity is considered, the influence hypothesis has as target domain culture 
and as source domains marriage, residence, workplace, and friendship. 
And lastly, human capital theory (e.g., Becker 1984) predicts that language 
skills, being a form of human capital, enhance career advancement (Chiswick & 
Miller 1995). Assimilation in the career domain will proceed faster if language skills 
are better. The ‘skill’ hypothesis has as target domain career and as source domain 
language. 
 
Derivation of the Matthew Effect 
It has been argued that in model building in the social sciences a procedure of 
stepwise increases in complexity is desirable (e.g., Lindenberg 1992). The classic 
model of assimilation, the straight line, is the simplest possible model for a social 
process. Let us take its formalization, a constant rate, αk, as baseline. This baseline has 
been repeatedly argued and shown to fail to capture the essence of the assimilation 
process. I therefore increase complexity minimally in a way that has maximal 
theoretical and empirical backing. Let B be a KxK matrix of coefficients. I maximize 
backing by adding terms that do not represent new hypotheses but rather the 
hypotheses discussed afore, which have not yet been rendered obsolete in the process 
of scientific inquiry. The added complexity is minimal because the hypotheses all fit a 
common form so that I only have to add one type of formal term to the constant rate 
equation for assimilation in domain k, namely i’s level of assimilation in target domain 
l, ail, multiplied by a coefficient βkl: 
  
∑
=
+ =
K
l
il kl k ik a a
1
β α &                          (5.1) 
 
I choose to introduce this term through addition, and not, for example,  
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multiplication. This choice is arbitrary, though convenient because it makes the system 
of differential equations linear, and thus solvable in closed form (e.g., Strogatz 
1994:123-44). In fact, the dynamical system of K equations of type (5.1) has been well 
studied across the physical sciences. The solution vector ai(t) is given by 
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Here, c is a vector of constants and λm is the m-th eigenvalue with 
corresponding eigenvector vm. If the coefficients βkl are zero, the summation in 
equation (5.1) simply drops out and we obtain the classical straight-line model of 
assimilation, with for each domain only a (positive) constant rate αk. And, adding an 
error term, we would get Herbert Gans’ “bumpy line” (1992:44). If, however, the 
coefficients βkl are instead positive, conform the assimilation hypotheses we reviewed, 
then the Perron-Frobenius theorem says that for some n, λn is real positive and strictly 
larger than all other eigenvalues, and that the corresponding eigenvector vn has non-
zero entries of the same sign. As inspection of equation (5.2) establishes, this means 
that as t becomes large, the term  n
t
n v e c
n λ comes to dominate in magnitude, as it is 
asymptotically approached by ai(t). Since  n
t
n v e c
n λ  grows exponentially with t, the 
system has only two attractors, namely maximal assimilation in all domains, ai → ∝, 
and minimal assimilation in all domains, ai → -∝, depending on whether cn is positive 
or negative. After sufficient time has elapsed, the immigrant finds herself on a solid 
trajectory of either ever increasing or ever decreasing assimilation. This is the 
Matthew Effect that Merton spoke of in the context of status in science – the famous 
becoming more famous and the fameless less famous, later borrowed to refer to 
increasing income inequality – the rich becoming richer and the poor poorer –, to  
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increasing educational inequality (Stanovich 1986), and musical taste (Salganik, 
Dodds, and Watts 2006). Which of the two trajectories the immigrant will follow 
depends on initial conditions. Immigrants who start off rather assimilated further 
assimilate. Immigrants who start off not so assimilated reverse assimilate. This 
endogenously-arrived-at dichotomization of immigrants into assimilators and reverse 
assimilators on the basis of initial assimilation levels appears to fit exogenously-
arrived-at dichotomizations on the basis of initial assimilation levels from the 
literature, such as the one between new and old immigrants (Massey 1995) and high 
and low capital migrants (Nee et al. 2002). 
 
Modes of Assimilation 
The Matthew Effect tells us what will ultimately happen to the immigrant 
under the model assumptions. It concerns the system behavior for sufficiently large t. 
The ultimate mode of assimilation is either assimilation in all domains or reverse 
assimilation in all domains. We have, however, not defined the unit of time, and thus 
left open the possibility that the Matthew Effect sets in postmortem. It is therefore 
informative to look at possible system behavior early on, for small t, before the 
eigenvector with largest eigenvalue starts to dominate and the Matthew Effect sets in. 
  These early assimilation dynamics cannot at any time involve assimilation in 
all domains ( 0 > i a & ) or reverse assimilation in all domains ( 0 < i a & ), because these 
states are self-perpetuating; once assimilation or reverse assimilation in all domains 
has set in, it cannot stop. They must therefore involve “selective assimilation” (Portes 
& Zhou 1993:90) where assimilation occurs in some domains but not in others. For 
example, no economic progress is made or no ethnic identity is lost. 
  We can visualize the early and ultimate assimilation dynamics together in a 
two-dimensional phase portrait if we reduce the number of domains K from eight to  
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two. Figure 5.1 shows a phase portrait with on the horizontal axis domain 1, say, 
structural assimilation, and on the vertical axis domain 2, say, acculturation, and for 
arbitrary parameters values α = 0, and B = 2 - I. The thick arrows represent ultimate 
assimilation dynamics. Once the immigrant finds herself in the area northeast of the 
lines a2 = -2a1 and a2 = -½a1, she monotonically assimilates in both domains. 
Similarly, once the immigrant finds herself in the area southwest of the lines a2 = -2a1 
and a2 = -½a1, she monotonically reverse assimilates in both domains. Before she 
arrives on either trajectory, which because of the Matthew Effect is inevitable, she 
may find herself temporarily in the area between the two lines, where she assimilates 
in one domain and reverse assimilates in the other. The thin arrows represent these 
early assimilation dynamics. If she starts northeast of the line a2 = -a1, these early 
assimilation dynamics will eventually bring her to the assimilation trajectory. If she 
starts southwest of the line a2 = -a1, she will drift towards the reverse assimilation 
trajectory. 
The modes of assimilation considered so far concerned individual migrants, 
within their lifetime. The model of assimilation developed here also allows for various 
modes of assimilation that have in the literature been specified for generations or 
ethnic groups, modes that the straight-line model did not allow. “Downward 
assimilation” (Portes & Rumbaut 2001:59) occurs when a second-generation 
immigrant becomes economically less successful than her parents. There are several 
ways this dynamic can be accommodated in the model, for example when  0 > i a & for 
the parents while the child finds herself selectively or reverse assimilating. If this were 
the case for enough first generation parents and second-generation children, we have 
an instantiation of the phenomenon of “second generation decline” (Gans 1992). 
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Note: K = 2, α = 0, and B = 2 - I. 
 
Figure 5.1. Phase Portrait of the Assimilation Model 
 
 
Testing Strategy 
I seek evidence that speaks for or against the hypotheses and for or against my 
claim that the Matthew Effect is empirically competitive with the straight line. The 
purest test is a direct estimation of the parameters in equation (5.1) as coefficients in a 
statistical model that is as similar as possible to the theoretical model developed afore. 
Each coefficient βkl and associated t value would then address a separate hypothesis 
from table 2. t values below –1.96 are votes against both the straight line and the 
Matthew Effect, t values between –1.96 and +1.96 are votes for the straight line, and t 
values above +1.96 are votes for the Matthew Effect. Moreover, plugging the 
estimated coefficients back into equation (5.1), one could do equilibrium analysis to 
a2 = -a1 
a2 = -2a1
a2 = -½a1 
a1 
a2 
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see whether there is either a single assimilation equilibrium (straight line), or an 
assimilation ánd a reverse assimilation equilibrium (Matthew Effect), or some other 
set of equilibria. 
  A strong candidate for such a statistical model is the Euler approximation of 
equation (5.1) with an error term added: 
 
() ik
K
k l
t il kl t ik kk k t ik a a a ε β β α + + + + = ∑
≠
+ , , 1 , 1                    (5.3) 
 
Conveniently, equation (5.3) is a regression equation with as dependent 
variable the target domain k at time t+1, as independent variables the target and source 
domains k and l at time t, and as estimable coefficients the theoretical model 
parameters. Needed to estimate equation (5.3) for each domain are measures of all 
eight domains at the beginning and end of some period of the immigrant’s stay in the 
host country. It does not matter what period, because the theoretical model assumes 
the assimilation process to be ahistoric – t does not appear at the right-hand side in 
equation (5.1). 
  The use of more than one observation of assimilation per individual 
necessitates data with that information, which is scarce due to the higher collection 
costs. In the past, scholars lacking repeated measurements had to address the problem 
by making comparisons between more and less recent migrants (e.g. table 9.1 in 
Massey et al. 1987:257) or by trusting respondents’ ability to retrospect (e.g. table 3 in 
Sanders et al. 2002:298-9). Fortunately, recently, a number of panel studies of 
assimilation were undertaken. For my analysis, I draw on the first two waves of the  
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Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC).
1 
  The target population of the LSIC is all immigrants aged 15+ who entered 
Canada between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001 from abroad with legal 
‘landed immigrant’ status. The sampling frame is an administrative database from 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada of all landed immigrants. This excludes those 
who landed from within Canada, who may have spent considerable time in Canada 
before landing. Although the ahistoric nature of the model makes it irrelevant what 
period out of the life of the immigrant is analyzed, the fact that all sampled immigrants 
are starters avoids certain omitted time variable biases. 
  Immigrants were interviewed six months, two years, and four years after 
landing. The numbers of respondents for the first and second wave are respectively 
14,356 and 9,332. Weights constructed by Statistics Canada, who collected the data, 
were designed to compensate for biases from non-response at both waves (see chapter 
12 of the Wave 2 User Guide). I will use these weights throughout the analysis. Note 
that the resulting rounding in head counts will make some cells not add up to their row 
or column totals. 
  These interviews were conducted face-to-face or by telephone in one of 15 
languages. Validity and reliability of responses were augmented in two ways. 
Computer-assisted interview technology automatically detected real time for various 
inconsistencies and errors in the responses, with previous questions being asked again 
until consistent. Also, Statistics Canada assured respondents’ beforehand that “…your 
answers will be kept strictly confidential. They will be added to answers from many 
other immigrants and then studied.” (p. 8 of LSIC wave 1 questionnaire). It enforced 
this promise by not releasing a PUMF, by having me undergo a security screening, 
                                                 
1 The research and analysis are based on data from Statistics Canada and the opinions expressed do not 
represent the views of Statistics Canada.  
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and by making me analyze the data in one of Canada’s Research Data Centers so that 
it could double-check that I did not accidentally reveal respondent-identifying 
information. For this reason, I can here not display minimum and maximum values or 
cross-tabulations with cell counts below 10. 
  For the intended regression equations, I need data at each wave on the level of 
assimilation of the respondent in each of the eight domains. The scaling of each 
variable is irrelevant, because the theoretical model leaves it unspecified, as long as 
higher scores represent higher levels of assimilation. The operationalizations of the 
eight domains are shown in the last column of table 1. For the household domain, I use 
a measure on the proportion of the household members who speak English and 
French. The existence of two official languages in Canada requires a decision on 
which measure(s) to use and how. In the analysis I will present, I use the measurement 
of French language skills for residents of Quebec and the measurement of English 
language skills otherwise. I have tried alternative strategies, such as separate models 
for Quebec and the rest of Canada, or models with both language measures included as 
separate variables, and these models do not alter the conclusions I will draw later. I 
would have preferred a measure of the actual ethnicity or country of origin of 
household members, but the LSIC questionnaire asks for spouse’s country of origin at 
wave 1 and for spouse’s ethnicity at wave 2, so that there is no wave-constant 
measurement of either. Fortunately, for all other structural assimilation variables, I do 
have wave-constant measures of ethnicity available to me. 
 For  the  language domain, I use the question “How well can you speak 
English/French?” Answer categories are “cannot speak this language”, “poorly”, 
“fairly well”, “well”, and “very well”. The computer skipped the question if 
English/French was both the first language of the respondent and the language spoken 
most often at home, which cases I treated as “very well”. Consistent with the  
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household measure, I consider French language skills for Quebec residents and 
English language skills for others. I considered responses equidistant and standardized 
them, recoding the five answer categories as respectively 0, ¼, ½, ¾, and 1. 
 For  the  residence domain, complete residential histories since landing for the 
first three digits of the postal code are available. I matched these with 2001 Canadian 
Census proportions neighborhood residents whose country of origin matches that of 
the respondent for those postal code areas. Note that this leads to a violation of the 
i.i.d. assumption. To correct for this violation I cluster cases by postal code and 
compute robust standard errors (Huber 1967). This reduces T values for most effects 
slightly. 
 For  the  workplace domain, I use the question “How many of your co-workers 
are of the same ethnic or cultural group as you?” Note that this question leaves it up to 
the respondent to define what her or his ethnic or cultural group is. An advantage of 
this question is that it measures assimilation in a way that is meaningful to the 
respondent. A drawback is that it permits a risk that assimilated migrants consider 
their ethnicity to be Canadian. Possible answers were “all of them”, “most of them”, 
“some of them”, and “none of them”, which I coded as 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1 respectively. 
The question was asked for respondents who ever worked since landing (wave 1) or 
since wave 1 (wave 2) and were not self-employed. I consider other respondents 
segregated in the workplace and assign them score 0. Whether or not this is the correct 
way to deal with these cases is debatable. Therefore, in analyses not reported on here I 
treated such cases as missing and these do not alter the conclusions I will draw later. 
 For  the  career domain, I measure the total personal income from all sources 
since landing (wave 1) or since wave 1 (wave 2). I follow the convention of taking the 
logarithm after imposing an artificial lower bound of 1 dollar. 
For the friendship domain, I use the question “How many of your friends are of  
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the same ethnic or cultural group as you?” Again, the question leaves it up to the 
respondent to define what her or his ethnic or cultural group is. Possible answers were 
“all of them”, “most of them”, “half of them”, “some of them”, and “none of them”, 
which I coded as 0, ¼, ½, ¾, and 1 respectively. Note the extra category in 
comparison to the workplace measure. The question was asked for respondents who 
made friends since landing (wave 1) or new friends since wave 1 (wave 2). For those 
without friends at wave 1, I made the same decision and ran the same robustness 
checks as for the colleague measure. The wave 2 measure concerns new friends. If 
wave 2 friends replaced the wave 1 friends, we could treat the answers as reflecting 
the entire Canadian friendship network. However, if they were added to the old 
friends, our best guess of the ethnic composition would be the average of the wave 1 
and wave 2 measurements. The structure of the questionnaire allows for both 
possibilities. In separate analyses not shown here I tried both operationalizations of 
friendship network composition, as well as analyses excluding these special cases, and 
found results to be robust. The results that are presented here are based on the 
assumption that new friends replace old friends. If there were no new wave 2 friends, I 
used the wave 1 measurement for wave 2 as well. 
For the culture domain, the LSIC contains no behavioral measures of 
engagement in cultural traditions, so I employ the attitudinal question “How important 
is it for you to carry on the values and traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or 
your homeland?” Answer categories are “very important” (0), “important” (1/3), “not 
very important” (2/3) and “not important at all.” (1) 
For the identity domain, I use a measure of perceived closeness to the ethnic 
group: “When you think of others in Canada from the same ethnic or cultural group as 
yourself, how close would you say you feel to that group as a whole?” Answers 
ranged from “very close” (0), to “close” (1/3), to “not very close” (2/3), to “not close  
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at all” (1). 
Some of these variables are of ordinal, others of interval measurement level. I 
report results from OLS regression models, but I did run parallel ordered and 
multinomial logistic regression models to verify that conclusions were robust across 
model specifications. Differences in the means of these eight variables at waves 1 and 
2 indicate assimilation patterns for the 2001 cohort of Canadian immigrants as a 
whole. The straight line permits no negative differences, while the Matthew Effect 
permits any differences. 
In the intended regression models, omitted variable bias may lead to a false 
assessment of the relative empirical tenability of the Matthew Effect with respect to 
the straight line. To reduce this risk, I control in all models for a number of variables. 
These are age, church attendance, and marital status, gender, domestic college degree, 
foreign college degree, immigration class, and Western, muslim, Asian, and Hispanic 
countries of origin. The first three are wave-specific measures, the others wave-
constant. 
Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations of all variables. I cannot 
report the exact numbers of missing observations per variable, because many of them 
are below 10 and thus shielded by Statistics Canada. Missing values reduce the sample 
from 9,332 to 8,575. I report on analyses of this smaller sample of list-wise deleted 
cases. It would not be correct to impute the domain variables, because each is also 
used as dependent variable. I ran models with imputed control variables and found no 
deviating results. As mentioned before, I can also not report minimum and maximum 
values. 
  All empirical domain variables are bounded, while none of the theoretical 
variables are. I deal with this discrepancy in two ways. First, I do not interpret intra-
domain effects, because strong ceiling effects are operating. Cross-domain effects do  
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not have this problem. Note that all hypotheses concern cross-domain effects; they are 
placed in off-diagonal cells in table 2. Second, in the equilibrium analysis I analyze 
the system behavior given a matrix B with the estimated cross-domain effects as fixed 
off-diagonal cells and varying inter-domain effects on the diagonal. 
 
Table 5.3. Means and Standard Deviations 
    Wave 1  Wave 2 
Domain Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
        
Household  Proportion household members who 
speak English/French 
.676 .251  .849 .244 
Language  English/French language skills  .675  .322  .740  .301 
Residence  Proportion neighbors from another 
country of origin 
.961 .053  .963 .052 
Workplace Proportion  cross-ethnic colleagues  .313 .383  .462 .396 
Career  Log annual individual income from 
all sources 
5.32 4.21  7.02 4.33 
Friendship  Proportion cross-ethnic friends  .316  .315  .396  .295 
Culture  Does not finds important to carry on 
ethnic traditions 
.276 .245  .264 .231 
Identity  Does not feel close to ethnic group  .354  .265  .343  .249 
          
 Age  35.0  12.0 36.6  12.0 
 Single  .240  .427 .222  .416 
  Attends religious services  .144  .351  .160  .367 
 Male  .497  .500     
  Holds college degree from foreign 
country 
.648 .478     
 Western  .061  .239     
 Muslim  .236  .425     
 Asian  .588  .492     
 Hispanic  .059  .235     
  Immigrant Class “Family”  .263  .440     
  Immigrant Class “Independent”  .670  .470     
  Immigrant Class “Business”  .061  .239     
  Immigrant Class “Refugee/Other”  .005  .074     
Note: I = 8,575 
 
  The estimated cross-domain effects will speak to the empirical tenability of the 
hypotheses, but not to the mechanisms through which they operate. At the end of the 
results section, I present some descriptive evidence concerning these mechanisms.   
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Results 
The differences between the wave 1 and wave 2 means of the domain variables in 
table 3 represent the change over 1½ years in the levels of assimilation of the average 
migrant of the 2001 cohort of immigrants to Canada. While any negative change 
would violate the straight-line model’s prediction of monotonous positive change, the 
Matthew-Effect model is not falsifiable at the group level. The table shows that the 
cohort as a whole assimilates along the household, language, workplace, career, and 
friendship domains. No significant assimilation occurs along the residence domain. 
Reverse assimilation is visible in the culture and identity domains. 
Table 4 shows the estimated theoretical parameters and the associated t values 
(both multiplied by 100 for a better visual assessment of the relative sizes), R
2, number 
of clusters, and number of observations from the eight corresponding linear regression 
models.  
Table 5.4. Results from Eight OLS Regression Models 
Wave 1↓  2→  Household Language  Residence Workplace  Career  Friendship Culture Identity 
  100 x  100 x  100 x  100 x  100 x  100 x  100 x  100 x 
  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par)  par  t(par) 
βkl                         
      Household     2 179  0 6  4 242  29 140  2 136  5 354  3 250 
      Language  21 1304     0 101  15 879  68 339  14 1052  -3 -308  -1 -88 
      Residence  31 441  37 513     36 459  -163 -112  73 1060  8 125  7 105 
   Workplace  1  102  -0 -12  0 247     167 1190  1 131  -0 -19  1 97 
      Career  -0 -247  -0 -76  -0 -222  0 185     -0 -81  0 65  0 54 
      Friendship  2 227  4 484  0 87  3 225  -3 -16     2 232  5 402 
      Culture  0 20  -1 -87  -0 -62  0 29  30 161  1 98     6 492 
      Identity  0 18  2 290  0 191  0 25  -24 -135  7 625  4 293    
          
βkk+1  18 1229  57 4845  77 2860  39 3126  245 1578  26 2252  22 1744  15 1264 
            
αk  14 212  1 21  21 853  -8 -101  623 432  -51 -797  6 93  16 260 
          
R
2  .26 .57 .70 .31 .24 .31 .10 .7 
#  clusters  894 894 894 894 894 894 894  894 
# migrants (I)  8,575 8,575 8,575 8,575 8,575 8,575 8,575  8,575 
Note: Effects of control variables are omitted 
Table 5.5. Hypothesis Testing 
Domain Household  Language  Residence Workplace  Career  Friendship Culture Identity 
Household    0 0 +  0 +  + 
Language  +    0  + + +     
Residence  +  +    + 0 +  0 0 
Workplace  0  0 +   +  0 0  0 
Career     –       
Friendship +  +  0  +      +  + 
Culture  0    0 0  0     
Identity 0   0  0    +     
Note: – = falsified;  0 = undecided;  + = confirmed
1
1
2 
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Of all 56 cross-domain effects, 3 have t values below –1.96, 31 have t values between 
–1.96 and +1.96, while 22 have t values above +1.96. We could count these as 3 votes 
against both models, 31 votes for the straight-line model, and 22 votes for the 
Matthew-Effect model. 
This test has some drawbacks. Strictly speaking, the Matthew Effect does not 
require every single cross-domain effect to be positive. Also, the competitive edge of 
the Matthew Effect over the straight-line increases with sample size. An alternative 
assessment of the competitiveness of the Matthew Effect with the straight line is an 
answer to the question whether the cross-domain coefficients in table 4 give rise to a 
straight-line dynamic, a Matthew Effect dynamic, or some other dynamic. The answer 
should come from the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the parameter matrix B. I 
constructed a matrix B with as off-diagonal entries the estimated cross-domain effects 
and with zeros on the diagonal. The eigenvalue with largest real part is then strictly 
positive, namely .146, and the corresponding eigenvector [.039 .026 .001 .073 .993 
.062 .032 .048] as well. As I discussed in the section “Derivation of the Matthew 
effect” this gives rise to a Matthew effect dynamic. This conclusion continues to hold 
for any sufficiently large intra-domain effects on the diagonal of B. For strongly 
negative intra-domain effects, the dominant eigenvalue becomes negative and the 
system dynamics drift towards an intermediate state of assimilation along all domains. 
This dynamic would be predicted by neither the straight-line nor the Matthew Effect. 
  Although all of these hypotheses are borrowed from the literature, for many 
this is one of the few tests if not the first with longitudinal data. Table 5 displays the 
results of the hypothesis testing. A ‘–’ signifies a t value below –1.96, a ‘0’ a t value 
between –1.96 and +1.96, and a ‘+’ a t value above +1.96. 1 hypothesis was falsified,  
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20 had an undecided test result, and 19 were confirmed. These counts are different 
from the counts for the cross-domain effects because for some cross-domain effects no 
hypotheses were formulated. We can express the results also in terms of “mechanisms 
of assimilation” (Alba & Nee 2003:38-57). The hypothesis associated with the 
affordability mechanism was rejected. Tests of hypotheses that operated through the 
attraction mechanism were all undecided. For each of the mechanisms exposure, 
interaction, referral, trust, influence, identification, skill, job prospects, and inclusion, 
some hypothesis that operates through that mechanism was confirmed and none 
rejected. 
  The evidence for and against these mechanisms is indirect. Hypotheses that 
were formulated on the bases of their operation through these mechanisms were tested, 
but table 4 does not speak to the question if they indeed operate through these 
mechanisms. It is possible that confirmations are mistakenly attributed to these 
mechanisms and that falsifications are due to counter-acting other mechanisms. Here I 
provide some complementary descriptive evidence that is suggestive of some of these 
mechanisms. 
The interaction mechanism associates assimilation along the target friendship 
domain with levels of assimilation in the household, residence, and workplace 
domains, through the functioning of the household, the neighborhood, and the 
workplace as meeting places where new friends are made. If the interaction 
mechanism is indeed the mechanism that drives these cross-domain effects, then when 
asked where they acquired these new friends, respondents should in large numbers 
mention these meeting places. Of all 7,385 respondents who reported new friends at 
wave 1, 4% said they acquired some of these through spouse’s work, 9% through their 
children’s school, 29% in their neighborhood, and 37% at work. Of all 8,076 
respondents who reported new friends at wave 2, 5% said they acquired some of these  
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through spouse’s work, 10% through their children’s school, 38% in their 
neighborhood, and 55% at work. 
The exposure mechanism associates assimilation along the language domain 
with the level of assimilation in the workplace through the opportunity for practicing 
language skills that a cross-ethnic workplace provides. If this effect indeed operates 
through the exposure mechanism, then at least it would have to be true that migrants 
much more often speak the official language with their co-workers in the mixed 
economy. Of all 435 respondents whose co-workers were all co-ethnic at wave 1, 34% 
said they spoke to their co-workers in English (French for Quebec), while of all 1,072 
respondents with no co-ethnic co-workers 95% said that they spoke English with their 
co-workers. Of all 538 respondents whose co-workers were all co-ethnic at wave 2, 
35% said they spoke to their co-workers in English, while of all 1,788 respondents 
with no co-ethnic co-workers 95% said that they spoke English with their co-workers. 
The referral mechanism associates assimilation along the workplace domain 
with the level of assimilation in the friendship domain through the opportunity for 
referrals to mixed economy jobs that cross-ethnic friends provide more than co-ethnic 
friends. If this effect indeed operates through the referrals mechanism, then at least it 
would have to be true that referrals to mixed economy jobs less often come from co-
ethnic friends than ethnic economy jobs do. Of all 740 respondents who at wave 1 had 
only cross-ethnic supervisors and said they found their job through a referral by a 
friend, 79% said this friend was co-ethnic, while of all 551 respondents who at wave 1 
had some co-ethnic supervisor and said they found their job through a referral by a 
friend, 94% said this friend was co-ethnic. Similarly, at wave 2, of all 758 respondents 
who had only cross-ethnic supervisors and said they found their job through a referral 
by a friend, 72% said this friend was co-ethnic, while of all 506 respondents who had 
some co-ethnic supervisor and said they found their job through a referral by a friend,  
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95% said this friend was co-ethnic. 
 
Discussion 
I have synthesized into an alternative model theoretical work that followed 
repeated falsification of the standard model of immigrant assimilation and assessed its 
empirical competitiveness. In the process, I have provided evidence from panel data 
for and against a series of hypotheses and associated mechanisms from this theoretical 
work. I finish by proposing ways in which limitations to the current study can be 
addressed in future work and by relating the study to contemporary perspectives, 
debates, and public policy. 
  A first limitation is the mismatch between the unbounded assimilation 
variables in the theoretical model and the bounded assimilation variables in the 
empirical model. This prevented me from using the estimates from the regression 
models as diagonal entries in the matrix B, thereby necessitating an assumption about 
these entries to investigate the observed assimilation dynamics and thus weakening the 
confidence in the evidence for the existence of a Matthew Effect. Transforming the 
empirical variables so that they become unbounded is not an option, because 
respondents with as scores on the bounded assimilation variables the extreme values 0 
and 1 could not be given a finite score. The only option in future work is to leave the 
empirical variables bounded, and to instead bound the theoretical variables. This 
would make the dynamical system nonlinear and complicate system analysis. An 
example is a model consisting of a logistic map (e.g., May 1976) for each target 
domain, the rate of each map being a function of the source domains. Following the 
principle of stepwise complexity, I here decided to add minimal complexity and stay 
as close to existing models and theory, thereby sacrificing the match between 
empirical and theoretical model. I did, however, estimate an alternative empirical  
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model that has a weaker link with theory but allows for a test of the existence of a 
Matthew Effect without needing any assumptions about within-domain effects. The 
eight domains are represented by dichotomous variables with as only values “high 
assimilation” and “low assimilation” and the model regresses the logit of each target 
domain at wave 2 additively on the target and source domains at wave 1. The Matthew 
Effect is found back in this alternative model in three ways. First, of the 56 cross-
domain effects, 32 are significantly positive, 24 are insignificant, and 0 are 
significantly negative. Second, calling a situation in which one is highly assimilated in 
m domains an “m-state”, the model then yields the following vector of K + 1 
probabilities with which m-states at t reproduce themselves at t + 1: [.159 .064 .035 
.026 .026 .031 .047 .081 .172]. Thus, the 0-state (low assimilation in all domains) and 
the 8-state (high assimilation in all domains) reproduce themselves with a higher 
probability than other states: They are more stable. Third, the Markov chain with 2
8 x 
2
8 transition matrix that the parameters in this logit give rise to has a 2
8-entry steady 
state vector in which m-states have the following nine average probabilities: [.032 
.025 .028 .042 .069 .100 .156 .235 .316]. Again, the probabilities follow a bimodal 
distribution over m-states, albeit skewed. 
  A second limitation is the confinement of the empirical analysis to the first 
years of first-generation immigrants. The fact that the LSIC samples the same period 
in the same calendar year for the same generation prevents the interference of period 
and calendar time effects. The cost is that it prevents me from testing the theoretical 
model’s assumption that assimilation is ahistoric. The generalizability of the Matthew 
Effect to other periods and generations can be assessed through a replication of this 
study using other longitudinal surveys that were recently conducted or are currently 
underway. The third wave of the LSIC allows for a test for later years in the 
experience of first-generation immigrants and the Children of Immigrants  
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Longitudinal Study a test for second-generation immigrants. 
  Third, I have not investigated the system dynamics at the group level beyond a 
demonstration that the model allows for some of the modes of assimilation that have 
been identified in past work for groups and generations. In the current model, the 
assimilation of individual migrants occurs independently. At the group level, the 
Matthew Effect, pushing immigrants to one of two extremes, produces a tendency 
toward bimodal distributions of assimilation variables. This tendency has been found 
back in empirical studies. For example, Esser (1987) noted such bimodality in the 
ethnic friendship network compositions of first- and second-generation Turkish and 
Yugoslavian immigrants to Germany. There are two reasons to suspect that the 
Matthew Effect at the level of the individual migrant scales up to the level of the 
ethnic group if the assimilation of migrants is made interdependent. The first reason is 
that some domains of assimilation for migrant i cannot change unless some domains of 
migrant j change in the same direction. For example, by marrying someone of another 
ethnicity one assimilates in the household domain, and so does partner. A similar logic 
applies to the other structural assimilation domains: residence, workplace, and 
friendship. This logic caused Schelling (1971) to find that small deviations from 
assimilation in the residence domain for some migrants could cause reverse 
assimilation in that domain for all other migrants; One migrant cannot move without 
reducing the proportion of co-ethnic neighbors for some stayers. The second reason is 
that many of the mechanisms that underlie the hypotheses about cross-domain effects 
within migrants are equally valid for hypotheses about cross-domain effects between 
migrants. For example, if the language skills of some migrants improve, then through 
the exposure mechanisms the language skills of other migrants improve as well. The 
significant effect of English language skills on the proportion of members who speak 
English in the household and its marginally significant converse effect provide some  
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evidence for the existence of such cross-domain, cross-migrant effects. If the domains 
across migrants are mathematically related in the same way the domains within 
migrants are, then the Perron-Frobenius theorem equally applies to the population of 
migrants; after sufficient time, either all migrants are assimilating in all domains, or all 
migrants are reverse assimilating in all domains. This suggests that the snowball 
effects that Massey et al. (1987) and Palloni et al. (2001) find in the entry phase of 
migration, where one migrant increases the chance of a second migrant, may 
generalize to the adjustment phase: The more migrants make the step from segregation 
to integration, the more likely subsequent migrants follow. See Esser (1985, 2003) for 
a model of interdependent assimilation that allows for a similar threshold dynamic. 
  Fourth, the model developed here makes multiple assimilation experiences 
possible for any migrant. Which one she will undergo depends on initial conditions, as 
shown in the section ‘modes of assimilation’. I have not investigated what determines 
these initial conditions. One candidate factor is relative group size. Following the logic 
of Blau & Schwartz (1984), large groups will by random chance equip their members 
with more co-ethnic neighbors, friends, household members, and colleagues. This 
makes it more likely they start off on a reverse assimilation trajectory than members of 
smaller groups. In multi-level models not shown here I found a significantly negative 
effect of group size at the national level on both the initial level of assimilation and on 
the change between wave 1 and wave 2. The Chinese, forming the largest immigrant 
group in Canada, start off most segregated and more likely reverse assimilate than 
members of other groups. 
The study speaks to contemporary perspectives, debates, and public policy in a 
number of ways. First, the only rejected hypothesis was what has been called the 
‘spatial assimilation hypothesis’, operating through an affordability mechanism. This 
hypothesis has been critiqued earlier in the literature (e.g., Logan & Molotch 1987,  
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Denton & Massey 1989, Crowder & South 2005). Scholars have argued that even with 
better incomes, racial discrimination in the housing market prevents economically 
assimilated migrants from moving out of ethnically segregated neighborhoods. The 
rejection of the hypothesis in the current study supports this critique. 
  Second, while confirmation was found for the ‘ecological’ hypothesis with 
residence as its source domain, an insignificantly negative effect was found for the 
ecological hypothesis with workplace as its source domain. This speaks to the 
aforementioned ethnic enclave debate by suggesting that ethnic segregation hurts in 
the residence domain, but may benefit in the workplace domain. According to the 
empirical analysis, most mobile are migrants who work with co-ethnics but live with 
cross-ethnics. 
  Third, a more recent debate in the immigration literature is one between two 
contrasting perspectives on the adaptation process that some have dubbed 
‘assimilationist’ vs. ‘transnationalist’ (e.g., Portes, Haller & Guarnizo 2002, Guarnizo, 
Portes & Haller 2003, Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). The debate centers around the 
question whether length of stay and mobility in the host country reduce respectively 
increase the chance of engagement in political or economic activities that involve the 
homeland. The theoretical model advocated here leaves the effect of length of stay 
undetermined because it in principle allows for two ultimate assimilation courses, 
further and further assimilation or further and further reverse assimilation. Average 
ethnic identification and cultural distinction were found to increase over time in the 
empirical model. As for the effect of mobility, the theoretical model says that those 
with more resources are on the one hand more able to engage in transnational 
activities but on the other hand are less likely to identify with the homeland. However, 
no significant effect of income on identification was found in the empirical model. 
  Lastly, if immigrant assimilation along certain domains is politically desirable  
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(typically, structural assimilation) or undesirable (typically, cultural assimilation), and 
tax dollars can be used to speed up or slow down assimilation along certain domains, 
then the present study suggests that these exhibit non-constant marginal returns. 
Minimally and maximally assimilated migrants will not move unless pushed away 
from equilibrium along multiple domains. Targeted intervention that involves multiple 
domains of few migrants, such as sponsored family adoptions of migrants, with which 
European governments have experimented, are then more effective. By contrast, the 
semi-assimilated can be steered rather cheaply. For them, general policies that involve 
a single domain for many migrants, such as mandatory language programs, subsidies 
for schools with minority representation, or sponsoring of ethnic organizations, are 
more likely to work. But according to the model developed here, any policy that is 
aimed at permanent selective assimilation is doomed to fail. Structural assimilation in 
combination with the continued practicing of cultural traditions and strong ethnic 
identification is a (potentially very long, but nevertheless strictly) temporal 
phenomenon. Ultimately the Matthew Effect takes over, either reversing course along 
the structural domains or setting in motion a process of cultural detachment and fading 
ethnic identification. 
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CHAPTER 6: FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this last chapter, I briefly sketch four follow-up studies. Follow-up study 1 
tests the behavioral assumption that the models of chapters 2, 3, and 4 share in a 
laboratory experiment. Follow-up study 2 consists of additional tests of the 
assimilation model of chapter 5 using different surveys. Follow-up studies 3 and 4 
serve to illustrate two strategies for exploiting the promise of Internet data. In both 
illustrations, the objective is a test of the operation of the selection and influence 
processes mentioned in chapters 2 and 5. Follow-up study 3 is an online game 
experiment. Follow-up study 4 uses continuous-time data on the co-evolution of 
networks and behavior from actual online environments. 
  The theory in this dissertation has been of two types and therefore gives rise to 
distinct avenues of future research. The type of theory in chapters 2, 3, and 4 has been 
simplistic. The aim was to derive formal and computational results that are insightful, 
rather than predictive. Strong assumptions were made that we could know from the 
onset would never hold in any particular empirical instance. Actors were only 
interested in one type of network-derived benefit: Structural balance, structural holes, 
or gains from trade. They knew all other actors and whom those were connected to. 
And they were perfectly able to process all that information as to arrive at a utility-
maximizing choice. In chapter 5, by contract, the theoretical model had a large 
empirical scope. Although the hypotheses were borrowed from theories from across 
the literature rather than deduced from a unified theory, the model extends to any time 
during the assimilation process of any immigrant of any generation in any Western 
country. The assimilation model is immediately applicable to contemporary 
immigration. 
  These distinctions in type of theory give rise to different avenues for future  
  129
research. There is little use in testing the equilibrium predictions of chapters 2, 3, and 
4 in the field, because no empirical setting falls within the strong scope conditions of 
any of the models in these chapters. Useful to test is only the behavioral assumption, 
under the artificially controlled satisfaction in the laboratory of all scope conditions 
that would be violated in natural environments. This is proposed study 1 below. All 
other welcome follow-up investigations of these chapters are of a purely theoretical 
nature. They should ask if and how the main result alters if what scope conditions are 
modified. These robustness checks were already extensively discussed in the 
discussion sections of the three respective chapters. 
 
Follow-up Study 1. Testing the Behavioral Assumption of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
I borrow from Burger & Buskens (2007) an experimental environment that 
imposes all scope conditions of the strategic network formation models of chapters 2, 
3, and 4. The environment consists of a number of networked computers equaling the 
number of agents in the model. Subjects see the entire network on a screen and click 
links to add and delete relations with other subjects. A screenshot is displayed in 
figure 6.1.  
Subjects are informed on precisely how network configurations translate into 
profit that they receive at the end of the experiment. Cumulative profit and is 
continuously visible in the bottom-right corner of the screen. This profit function can 
be varied to match the profit functions of chapters 2, 3, and 4. In each chapter it was 
assumed that actors would add ties that increase utility and delete ties that decrease 
utility in the short run. The proposed experiment directly assesses how many of the 
link changes made by subjects violate this behavioral assumption. The experiment also 
assesses if the deviations from the assumed behavior prevent the predicted equilibrium 
network from emerging.  
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Source: Figure 3 in Burger & Buskens (2007) 
 
Figure 6.1. Screenshot of a Networking Experiment 
 
The assimilation model developed in chapter 5 turned out to be predictive. It 
was found empirically competitive with the standard model of assimilation. However, 
its test remained limited to the first two years of first-generation immigrants to 
Canada. The scope of the model extends to all stages of all generations of any Western 
country. In follow-up study 2, I propose additional tests for other years of other 
generations in other countries. 
 
Follow-up Study 2. Additional Tests of the Assimilation Model of Chapter 5 
Three recently collected data-sources allow for these additional tests of the 
model. First, during the summer of 2007 the third wave of the LSIC becomes  
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available, allowing for a test of the model for later stages in the assimilation process, 
until four years after entry. Comparing model estimates for the wave 1-->2 transition 
with those for the wave 2-->3 transition, I can then assess if the process is indeed 
ahistoric, which would be the case if the coefficient matrix B does not change 
significantly from the first transition to the next. The third wave also allows me to 
obtain within-subject effect estimates, comparing for each immigrant the wave 1-->2 
transition with the wave 2-->3 transition, getting rid of all potential time-constant 
omitted variable bias. Second, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study allows 
for a test of the assimilation model for second-generation immigrants. Third, the New 
Immigrant Survey has yielded data comparable to the LSIC for contemporary 
immigrants to the United States. The first two waves will be available Fall 2007. The 
foci of these surveys on different aspects of the assimilation process may restrict me in 
the number of domains for which I can run the regression models. 
 
Homophily is the tendency for people to interact with those with similar 
identities. As mentioned in chapter 2, a host of social-psychological theories from the 
mid-20
th century attributed this to striving for the elimination of psychic discomfort 
with imbalanced situations in which interaction partners have different identities. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, there are two fundamental mechanisms through which such 
elimination can take place: Either one changes identity or one changes interaction 
partner. The former is called influence, the latter selection. 
Online environments provide a new testing ground that improves on offline 
environments in a number of ways. All aspects of every instance of behavior are 
recorded without human error and for free. They allow for the study of groups whose 
members are not geographically proximate, or who do not even know where the others 
are. And online games can be designed that constitute experimental environments in  
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which many subjects participate gladly and for free. Follow-up studies 3 and 4 
exemplify these new opportunities by outlining two strategies for testing the operation 
of selection and influence mechanisms in the creation of homophily. 
 
Follow-up study 3: Online Experiment to Test Selection and Influence 
People spend increasing amounts of time in online environments where their 
visible identity is reduced to a colorful nametag. Online name formation is highly 
interactive: Chatters change their name to broadcast a continuous message to or about 
someone else in the chatroom and gamers form clans with associated name formats. In 
some games, names are given, in others, names can be changed at any time. In some 
games, players can choose their partner, in others, they are randomly matched. I 
investigate if in these anonymous environments, patterns of identity form through the 
same mechanisms that underlie identity formation in offline environments, namely 
through the dual processes of selection - people choose interaction partners they 
identify with - and influence - people come to identify with partners they interact with 
a lot. To this end I propose an online game that can be played in four conditions, with 
or without name changing, and with or without partner selection. 
The game is fun so that subjects like to play and create data. The game 
involves cooperation among two players. A player is re-matched after the game and 
the game is repeated until she logs off. Players can log on to the game environment 
like any other game environment: They get a username and password. Usernames are 
randomly assigned to four conditions. In condition 1, players obtain a fixed player 
name and are randomly matched with another player. In condition 2, players obtain a 
fixed player name and select their partner from a list. In condition 3, players obtain a 
variable player name that they can continuously update through simple mouse clicks 
and are randomly matched with another partner. In condition 4, players obtain a  
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variable player name and select their partner from a list. Conditions 2 and 4 allow for 
selection, conditions 3 and 4 for influence. The conditions are expected to yield 
different homophily levels, which can with this design be traced back to the 
underlying mechanisms. My own experience playing games online is that homophily 
in player names is easy to spot with the naked eye and even with a not so sophisticated 
algorithm. If the pilot shows that this is not the case, one could decide to simplify 
identity formation to the choice of pre-selected simple shapes and colors.  
 
Follow-Up Study 4: Using Twitter Data to Test Selection and Influence 
Twitter is “a global community of friends and strangers answering one simple 
question: What are you doing?” (http://twitter.com/) Participants use phone, instant 
messaging, or web talk. Twitter is an example of an online environment in which 
identities and networks are continuously recorded. Users post a message and select an 
audience. Only the audience sees the message. Currently, the audience data are not 
available. The analysis I propose assumes that these data have become available. If an 
influence mechanism is operating, then the contents of messages from one user should 
increasingly contain words that are used in messages from other users with the focal 
user in their audience. If a selection mechanism is operating, then the users should 
change their interaction partners, choosing to receive only messages with contents 
similar to one’s own messages. Since many Twitter messages are sent every second, 
these data are of enormous precision. Moreover, there is little measurement error 
because recording occurs electronically and automatically. 
 
I plan to execute some of these follow-up studies myself in the coming years. 
  
  134
References 
Burger, Martijn & Vincent Buskens. 2007. Social Context and Network Formation: 
Experimental Studies. Utrecht, Netherlands: ISCORE paper 234. 